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CRIMINAL LAW 
THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT’S DILEMMA: 
AN INNOVATIVE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE 
PROBLEM 
LUCIAN E. DERVAN
*
 
AND 
VANESSA A. EDKINS, Ph.D.
**
 
 
In this Article, Professors Dervan and Edkins discuss a recent 
psychological study they completed regarding plea bargaining and 
innocence.  The study, involving dozens of college students and taking place 
over several months, revealed that more than half of the innocent 
participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a benefit.  
These research findings bring significant new insights to the long-standing 
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debate regarding the extent of plea bargaining’s innocence problem.  The 
Article also discusses the history of bargained justice and examines the 
constitutional implications of the study’s results on plea bargaining, an 
institution the Supreme Court reluctantly approved of in 1970 in return for 
an assurance that it would not be used to induce innocent defendants to 
falsely admit guilt. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1989, Ada JoAnn Taylor sat quietly in a nondescript chair 
contemplating her choices.
1
  On a cold February evening four years earlier, 
a sixty-eight-year-old woman was brutally victimized in Beatrice, 
Nebraska.
2
  Police were now convinced that Taylor and five others were 
responsible for the woman’s death.
3
  The options for Taylor were stark.
4
  If 
she pleaded guilty and cooperated with prosecutors, she would be rewarded 
 
1 See Know the Cases: Ada JoAnn Taylor, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Ada_JoAnn_Taylor.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) 
[hereinafter Taylor, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT]. 
2 See id. (“Sometime during the night of February 5, 1985, 68-year-old Helen Wilson 
was sexually assaulted and killed in the Beatrice, Nebraska, apartment where she lived 
alone.”). 
3 But see id. (“An FBI analysis of the Wilson murder and the three other [related] crimes 
concluded that ‘we can say with almost total certainty that this crime was committed by one 
individual acting alone.’”). 
4 See id. 
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with a sentence of ten to forty years in prison.
5
  If, however, she proceeded 
to trial and was convicted, she would likely spend the rest of her life behind 
bars.
6
 
Over a thousand miles away in Florida, and more than twenty years 
later, a college student sat nervously in a classroom chair contemplating her 
options.
7
  Just moments before, a graduate student had accused her of 
cheating on a logic test being administered as part of a psychological study.  
The young student was offered two choices.  If she admitted her offense and 
saved the university the time and expense of proceeding with a trial before 
the Academic Review Board, she would simply lose her right to 
compensation for participating in the study.  If, however, she proceeded to 
the review board and lost, she would lose her compensation, her faculty 
advisor would be informed, and she would be forced to enroll in an ethics 
course. 
In Beatrice, Nebraska, the choice for Taylor was difficult, but the 
incentives to admit guilt were enticing.
8
  A sentence of ten to forty years in 
prison meant she would return home one day and salvage at least a portion 
of her life.
9
  The alternative, a lifetime behind bars, was grim by 
comparison.
10
  After contemplating the options, Taylor pleaded guilty to 
aiding and abetting second-degree murder.
11
  Twenty years later, the college 
student made a similar calculation.
12
  While the loss of compensation for 
 
5 See id. (“Ada JoAnn Taylor agreed with prosecutors to plead guilty and testify at the 
trial of co-defendant Joseph White regarding her alleged role in the murder.  In exchange for 
her testimony, she was sentenced to 10 to 40 years in prison.”). 
6 See id. 
7 See infra Part III (discussing the plea-bargaining study). 
8 See Taylor, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 1. 
9 See id. 
10 See id.; see also Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life 
Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 712 (1998) (discussing the 
severity of life in prison and noting that some death row inmates “waive their appeals out of 
fear that they will perhaps succeed and be faced with a mandatory LWOP sentence”).  As 
noted by one philosopher:  
What comparison can there really be, in point of severity between consigning a man to the short 
pang of a rapid death, and immuring him in a living tomb, there to linger out what may be a long 
life in the hardest and most monotonous toil, without any of its alleviation or rewards—debarred 
from all pleasant sights and sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation 
of bodily restraint, or a small improvement of diet? 
Id. (quoting LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, ULTIMATE PENALTIES: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT, PHYSICAL TORTURE 60 (1987) (quoting John Stuart Mill, Parliamentary 
Debate on Capital Punishment Within Prisons Bill (Apr. 21, 1868))). 
11 Taylor, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 1. 
12 See infra Part III (discussing the plea-bargaining study). 
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participating in the study was a significant punishment, it was certainly 
better than being forced to enroll in a time-consuming ethics course.
13
  Just 
as Taylor had decided to control her destiny and accept the certainty of the 
lighter alternative, the college student admitted that she had knowingly 
cheated on the test.
14
 
That Taylor and the college student both pleaded guilty is not the only 
similarity between the cases.  Both were also innocent of the offenses of 
which they had been accused.
15
  After serving nineteen years in prison, 
Taylor was exonerated after DNA testing proved that neither she nor any of 
the other five defendants in her case were involved in the murder.
16
  As for 
the college student, her innocence is assured by the fact that, unbeknownst 
to her, she was actually part of an innovative new study into plea bargaining 
and innocence.
17
  The study, conducted by the authors, involving dozens of 
college students and taking place over several months, not only recreated 
the innocent defendant’s dilemma experienced by Taylor, but also revealed 
that plea bargaining’s innocence problem is not isolated to an obscure and 
rare set of cases.
18
  Strikingly, the study demonstrated that more than half of 
the innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a 
perceived benefit.
19
  This finding brings new insights to the long-standing 
debate regarding the possible extent of plea bargaining’s innocence problem 
and ignites a fundamental constitutional question regarding an institution 
the Supreme Court reluctantly approved of in 1970 in return for an 
assurance that it would not be used to induce innocent defendants to falsely 
admit guilt.
20
 
This Article begins in Part II by examining the history of plea 
 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See Taylor, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 1. 
16 See id.  It should also be noted that five of the six defendants in the Wilson murder 
case pleaded guilty.  As described above, DNA evidence showed that all six defendants were 
innocent and played no role in the sexual assault or murder of Wilson.  See id.; see also 
Know the Cases: Debra Shelden, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/Debra_Shelden.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (“Debra Shelden agreed with 
prosecutors to plead guilty and testify falsely to her alleged role in the crime at the trial of 
co-defendant Joseph White in exchange for a lighter sentence.”); Know the Cases: James 
Dean, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/Content/James_Dean.php (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2012) (“Joseph White was the only defendant in this case to go to trial, and 
three of his five co-defendants testified against him in exchange for shorter sentences than 
those they may have received had their own cases gone to trial.”). 
17 See infra Part III (discussing the plea-bargaining study). 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 See infra Part III. 
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bargaining in the United States, including an examination of the current 
debate regarding the prevalence of plea bargaining’s innocence problem.
21
  
In Part III, this Article discusses the psychological study of plea bargaining 
conducted by the authors.
22
  This Part reviews the methodology and results 
of the study.
23
  Finally, Part III analyzes the constitutional limits placed on 
plea bargaining by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1970 decision, Brady 
v. United States.
24
  In this decision, the Supreme Court stated that plea 
bargaining was a tool for use only when the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming and the defendant might benefit from the opportunity to 
bargain.
25
  According to the Court, if it became evident that plea bargaining 
was being used more broadly to create incentives for questionably guilty 
defendants to “falsely condemn themselves,” the entire institution of plea 
bargaining and its constitutionality would require reexamination.
26
  Perhaps, 
as a result of this new study, a time for such reevaluation has arrived. 
II. THE HISTORICAL RISE OF PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS  
INNOCENCE PROBLEM 
On December 23, 1990, a twenty-one-year-old woman was robbed and 
sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant in New Jersey.
27
  Three days 
after the attack, and again a month later, the victim identified John Dixon as 
the perpetrator from a photo array.
28
  Dixon was arrested on January 18, 
1991, and ventured down a road familiar to criminal defendants in the 
United States.
29
  Threatened by prosecutors with a higher prison sentence if 
he failed to cooperate and confess to his alleged crimes, Dixon pleaded 
guilty to sexual assault, kidnapping, robbery, and unlawful possession of a 
weapon.
30
  He received a sentence of forty-five years in prison.
31
  Ten years 
 
21 See infra Part II (discussing the historical rise of plea bargaining and its innocence 
problem). 
22 See infra Part III (discussing the plea-bargaining study). 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
25 Id. at 752. 
26 Id. at 757–58; see also Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s 
Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51.  
27 Know the Cases: John Dixon, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/John_Dixon.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) 
[hereinafter Dixon, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT] (describing the story of John Dixon, who 
pleaded guilty to rape charges for fear that he would receive a harsher sentence if he 
proceeded to trial but who was later exonerated by DNA evidence). 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id.; see also Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea 
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later, however, Dixon was released from prison after DNA evidence 
established that he could not have been the perpetrator of the crime.
32
  
While the story of an innocent man pleading guilty and serving a decade in 
prison before exoneration is a tragedy, perhaps it should not be surprising 
given the prominence and power of plea bargaining in today’s criminal 
justice system.
33
 
Plea bargaining, however, was not always such a dominant force in the 
United States.
34
  In fact, when appellate courts first began to see an influx of 
such bargains around the time of the American Civil War, most struck 
down the deals as unconstitutional.
35
  Despite these early judicial rebukes, 
plea bargaining continued to linger in the shadows as a tool of corruption.
36
  
 
Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1398 (2004). 
By the time of the plea allocution it is clear that the defendant has decided to take the plea 
bargain and knows or has been instructed by counsel to tell the court that he did indeed do the 
crime.  Predictably, the National Institute of Justice survey found that judges rejected guilty pleas 
in only two percent of cases.  Since efficiency and speed is the name of the game, it is not 
unexpected that meaningful questioning of the defendant does not occur and it is not surprising 
that the Institute concluded that the plea allocution procedure is “close to being a new kind of 
‘pious fraud.’” 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence 
in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 93 (2005) (“But when it comes to the 
defendant’s ‘voluntariness’—the second half of the formula—courts have walked away.  The 
proper knowledge, together with a pro forma statement from the defendant that her guilty 
plea was not coerced, normally suffices.”). 
31 See Dixon, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 27. 
32 See id. 
33 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, fig.C [hereinafter 2010 SOURCEBOOK, fig.C], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/FigureC.
pdf (documenting that almost 97% of convicted defendants in the federal criminal justice 
system plead guilty). 
34 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 58; Lucian E. Dervan, Plea Bargaining’s Survival: 
Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, A Continued Triumph in a Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. 
L. REV. 451, 478 (2007); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 
13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273, 273 (1979) (“[Alschuler and Friedman] agree that plea 
bargaining was probably nonexistent before 1800, began to appear during the early or mid-
nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as a standard feature of American urban 
criminal courts in the last third of the nineteenth century.”).  For further discussion regarding 
the early history of plea bargaining, see John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea 
Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287 (1979); John H. 
Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261 
(1979); Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 281 (1979). 
35 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 58–59. 
36 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19–
24 (1979). 
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Then, in response to growing pressures on American courts due to 
overcriminalization in the early twentieth century, plea bargaining began a 
spectacular rise to power.
37
  That today almost 97% of convictions in the 
federal system result from pleas of guilt, such as John Dixon’s in New 
Jersey in 1991, is both a testament to the institution’s resilience and a 
caveat about its power of persuasion.
38
 
A. THE RISE OF PLEA BARGAINING 
While most discussions regarding the rise of plea bargaining begin in 
the late nineteenth century, the full history of plea bargaining dates back 
hundreds of years to the advent of confession law.
39
  As Professor Albert 
Alschuler noted, “[T]he legal phenomenon that we call a guilty plea has 
existed for more than eight centuries . . . [as] a ‘confession.’”
40
  
Interestingly, early legal precedent regarding confessions prohibited the 
offering of any inducement to prompt the admission.
41
  As an example, in 
the 1783 case of Rex v. Warickshall, an English court stated, “[A] 
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of 
fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given 
to it.”
42
  While plea bargaining as it exists today relies upon the use of 
incentives, common law prohibitions on such inducements persisted until 
well into the twentieth century.
43
 
 
37 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph (Yale)] (“There is no glory in plea 
bargaining.  In place of a noble clash for truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce . . . .  
But though its victory merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed . . . .  The battle has 
been lost for some time.”); see also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A 
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) [hereinafter FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S 
TRIUMPH]. 
38 See 2010 SOURCEBOOK, fig.C, supra note 33. 
39 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 12. 
40 See id. at 13.  
41 See id. at 12. 
42 See id. (“It soon became clear that any confession ‘obtained by [a] direct or implied 
promise[], however slight’ could not be received in evidence.  Even the offer of a glass of 
gin was a ‘promise of leniency’ capable of coercing a confession.” (footnotes omitted)). 
43 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 65–66 (discussing the evolution of the doctrine that 
guilty pleas must be voluntary); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea 
Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 657 (1981) (“Plea negotiation works . . . only 
because defendants have been led to believe that their bargains are in fact bargains.  If this 
belief is erroneous, it seems likely that the defendants have been deluded into sacrificing 
their constitutional rights for nothing.”); Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s 
Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 77–78 (2009) (“Assuming that prosecutors 
seek to maximize and defendants seek to minimize sentences, the price of any plea should be 
the product of the anticipated trial sentence and the likelihood of conviction, discounted by 
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The first influx of plea-bargaining cases at the appellate level in the 
United States occurred shortly after the Civil War.
44
  Relying on past 
confession precedent prohibiting the offering of incentives in return for 
admissions of guilt, various courts summarily rejected these bargains and 
permitted the defendants to withdraw their statements.
45
  These early 
American appellate decisions, however, did not prevent plea bargaining 
from continuing to operate in the shadows.
46
  Plea bargains continued to be 
used during this period, despite strong precedential condemnation, at least 
in part as a tool of corruption.
47
  As an example, and as Professor Alschuler 
has previously noted, there are documented accounts that by 1914 a defense 
attorney in New York would “stand out on the street in front of the Night 
Court and dicker away sentences in this form: $300 for ten days, $200 for 
twenty days, $150 for thirty days.”
48
  Such bargains were not limited to 
New York.
49
  One commentator in 1928 discussed the use of “fixers,” who 
negotiated bargains between the government and the defense in Chicago, 
Illinois: 
 
some factor to reflect the resources saved by not having to try the case.”). 
44 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 19–21. 
45 See id.  Alschuler provides several examples of statements made by the appellate 
courts examining plea bargains in the late nineteenth century.   
 The least surprise or influence causing [the defendant] to plead guilty when he had any 
defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not guilty. 
 . . . 
 No sort of pressure can be permitted to bring the party to forego any right or advantage 
however slight.  The law will not suffer the least weight to be put in the scale against him. 
 [W]hen there is reason to believe that the plea has been entered through inadvertence . . . and 
mainly from the hope that the punishment to which the accused would otherwise be exposed may 
thereby be mitigated, the Court should be indulgent in permitting the plea to be withdrawn. 
Id. at 20 (citations omitted).  A legal annotation from the period stated:  
We would conclude, from an examination of all the cases upon the subject, that where there is an 
inducement of any kind held out to the prisoner, by reason of which he enters the plea of guilty, 
it will . . . better comport with a sound judicial discretion to allow the plea to be withdrawn . . ., 
and especially so when counsel and friends represent to the accused that it has been the custom 
and common practice of the court to assess a punishment less than the maximum upon such a 
plea . . . . 
Id. at 24 (quoting M.W. Hopkins, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty, 11 CRIM. L. MAG. 479, 484 
(1889)). 
46 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 22. 
47 See id. at 24 (“The gap between these judicial denunciations of plea bargaining [in the 
late nineteenth century] and the practices of many urban courts at the turn of the century and 
thereafter was apparently extreme.  In these courts, striking political corruption apparently 
contributed to a flourishing practice of plea bargaining.”). 
48 Id. (citations omitted). 
49 See id. at 24–25. 
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This sort of person is an abomination and it is a serious indictment against our system 
of criminal administration that such a leech not only can exist but thrive.  The “fixer” 
is just what the word indicates.  As to qualifications, he has none, except that he may 
be a person of some small political influence.
50
 
The use of plea bargaining by such “fixers” ensured that the practice would 
survive despite judicial repudiation, though a later phenomenon ultimately 
brought it out of the shadows.
51
 
While corruption kept plea bargaining alive during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, overcriminalization necessitated plea 
bargaining’s emergence into mainstream criminal procedure and its rise to 
dominance.
52
  According to one analysis of individuals arrested in Chicago 
in 1912, “more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which 
did not exist twenty-five years before.”
53
  As the number of criminal 
statutes—and, as a result, criminal defendants—swelled, court systems 
became overwhelmed.
54
  In searching for a solution, prosecutors turned to 
bargained justice, the previous bastion of corruption, as a mechanism by 
which official and “legitimate” offers of leniency might ensure defendants 
waived their rights to trial and cleared cases from the dockets.
55
  The 
 
50 Id.  This quotation is attributed to Albert J. Harno, Dean, University of Illinois Law 
School.  See id. 
51 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 59 (“While corruption introduced plea bargaining to the 
broader legal community, it was the rise in criminal cases before and during Prohibition that 
spurred its growth and made it a legal necessity.”). 
52 See id.; see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey 
of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155, 1156–61 (2005) (discussing the 
relationship between broadening legal rules and plea bargaining); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519–20 (2001) (discussing 
the influence of broader laws on the rate of plea bargaining).  For a definition of 
“overcriminalization,” see Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic 
Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 
645–46 (2011).  Similarly, consider the significant ramifications that would follow should 
there no longer be overcriminalization: 
The law would be refined and clear regarding conduct for which criminal liability may attach.  
Individual benefits, political pressure, and notoriety would not incentivize the invention of novel 
legal theories upon which to base liability where none otherwise exists, despite the already 
expansive size of the United States criminal code.  Further, novel legal theories and overly-broad 
statutes would not be used to create staggering sentencing differentials that coerce defendants, 
even innocent ones, to falsely confess in return for leniency. 
 Id. at 645–46. 
53 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 32. 
54 See Dervan, supra note 52, at 650 (“In return for agreeing not to challenge the 
government’s legal assertions and for assisting in lessening the strain created by 
overcriminalization, defendants were permitted to plead guilty to reduced charges and in 
return for lighter sentences.”). 
55 See id. 
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reliance on bargains during this period is evidenced by the observed rise in 
guilty plea rates.
56
  Between 1908 and 1916, the number of federal 
convictions resulting from pleas of guilty rose from 50% to 72%.
57
 
The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and advent of the 
Prohibition era in 1919 only exacerbated the overcriminalization problem 
and required further reliance on plea bargaining to ensure the continued 
functionality of the justice system.
58
  As George Fisher noted in his seminal 
work on plea bargaining, prosecutors had little option other than to continue 
attempting to create incentives for defendants to avoid trial.
59
  By 1925, 
almost 90% of criminal convictions were the result of guilty pleas.
60
  By the 
end of the Prohibition era, plea bargaining had successfully emerged from 
the shadows of the American criminal justice system to take its current 
place as an indispensable solution for an overwhelmed structure.
61
 
Though plea-bargaining rates rose significantly in the early twentieth 
century, appellate courts were still reluctant to approve such deals when 
appealed.
62
  For example, in 1936, Jack Walker was charged with armed 
robbery.
63
  In a scene common in today’s criminal justice system, 
prosecutors threatened to seek a harsh sentence if Walker failed to 
cooperate, but offered a lenient alternative in return for a guilty plea.
64
  
Facing a sentence twice as long if he lost at trial, Walker pleaded guilty.
65
  
The United States Supreme Court found the bargain constitutionally 
impermissible, noting that the threats and inducements had made Walker’s 
plea involuntary.
66
 
 
56 See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 33. 
57 See id. at 27. 
58 See Scott Schaeffer, The Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the Eighteenth 
Amendment: Chicago and the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL. 385, 391–98 (2011) 
(discussing the history of the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment). 
59 See FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, supra note 37, at 210; see also Alschuler,  
supra note 36, at 28 (“The rewards associated with pleas of guilty were manifested not only 
in the lesser offenses of which guilty-plea defendants were convicted but also in the lighter 
sentences that they received.”). 
60 Alschuler, supra note 36, at 27.  
61 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 60 (“As Prohibition was extinguished, the United States 
continued its drive to create new criminal laws, a phenomenon that only added to the courts’ 
growing case loads and the pressure to continue to use bargaining to move cases through the 
system.”). 
62 See, e.g., Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1941). 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 280. 
65 Id. at 281. 
66 See id. at 279–86; see also Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892) (requiring 
that defendant voluntarily avail himself of the option to plead guilty). 
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[Walker] was deceived and coerced into pleading guilty when his real desire was to 
plead not guilty or at least to be advised by counsel as to his course.  If he did not 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he was deceived or coerced by the 
prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he was deprived of a constitutional right.
67
 
Once again, despite plea bargaining’s continued presence in the court 
system, the Supreme Court was reluctant to embrace the notion of 
bargained justice and coerced confessions.
68
 
By 1967, despite a continued rejection of plea bargaining by appellate 
courts, even the American Bar Association (ABA) was beginning to see the 
benefits of the practice.
69
  In a report regarding the criminal justice system, 
the ABA noted that the use of plea bargaining allowed for the resolution of 
many cases without a trial, which was necessary given the system’s lack of 
resources.
70
  In particular, the report noted that “the limited use of the trial 
process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting 
the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption 
of innocence.”
71
 
 
67 Walker, 312 U.S. at 286; see also ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011) (noting that a study of misdemeanor cases in Florida 
courts found that 66% of defendants appeared at arraignment without counsel and almost 
70% of defendants pleaded guilty or no contest at arraignment).  According to the NACDL 
report, “[t]rial judges failed to advise the unrepresented defendants of their right to counsel 
in open court . . . only 27% of the time.”  Id.  In less than 50% of the cases, the judges asked 
the defendants if they wanted an attorney.  See id.  Finally, the report stated, “only about 
one-third of the time did the trial judge discuss the importance and benefits of counsel or 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.”  Id. 
68 During the period between 1941 and 1970, several additional appellate cases 
challenged the constitutionality of plea bargaining.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 
U.S. 570, 571–72 (1968) (striking down a statute that allowed for the death penalty only 
when a defendant failed to plead guilty and moved forward with a jury trial as an 
“impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right”); Machibroda v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 487, 491–93 (1962) (finding a prosecutor’s offer of leniency and threats of 
additional charges an improper inducement that stripped the voluntariness of defendant’s 
guilty plea); Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment set aside, 
246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (involving a 
defendant the court determined was induced to plead guilty by the promise of a light 
sentence and the dismissal of other pending charges).  In Shelton, the court stated, “[j]ustice 
and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter.”  242 F.2d at 113.  
69 See AM. BAR ASS’N, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (Tentative Draft 1967) [hereinafter ABA 
PROJECT]. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. 
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system.  Such pleas 
tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for 
funds and personnel.  If the number of judges, courtrooms, court personnel and counsel for 
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Three years after the ABA embraced plea bargaining as a necessary 
tool in an overburdened system, the United States Supreme Court finally 
directly addressed the constitutionality of modern plea bargaining in the 
case of Brady v. United States.
72
  The case involved a defendant charged 
with kidnapping in violation of federal law.
73
  The charged statute permitted 
the death penalty, but only where recommended by a jury.
74
  This meant 
that a defendant could avoid capital punishment by pleading guilty.
75
  
Realizing his chances of success at trial were minimal given that his 
codefendant had agreed to testify against him, Brady pleaded guilty and 
was sentenced to fifty years in prison.
76
  He later changed his mind, 
however, and sought to have his plea withdrawn, arguing that his act was 
induced by his fear of the death penalty.
77
 
Prior precedent regarding plea bargaining suggested that the Supreme 
Court would look with disfavor upon the defendant’s decision to plead 
guilty in return for the more lenient sentence, but plea bargaining’s rise 
during the previous century and its unique role by 1970 protected the 
practice from absolute condemnation.
78
  Instead of finding plea bargaining 
unconstitutional, the Court acknowledged the necessity of the institution to 
protect crowded court systems from collapse.
79
  The Court then went on to 
 
prosecution and defense were to be increased substantially, the funds necessary for such 
increases might be diverted from elsewhere in the criminal justice process.  Moreover, the 
limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting 
the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of innocence. 
Id. 
72 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970). 
73 See id.  Interestingly, the defendant in Brady was charged under the same federal 
statute at issue in the 1968 case of United States v. Jackson.  See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583; 
see also Dervan, supra note 26, at 75–76 (“With regard to the federal kidnapping statute, 
[the Jackson court stated that] the threat of death only for those who refuse to confess their 
guilt is an example of a coercive incentive that makes any resulting guilty plea invalid.”). 
74 The law, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), read as follows:   
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person who has been 
unlawfully . . . kidnap[p]ed . . . and held for ransom . . . or otherwise . . . shall be punished (1) by 
death if the kidnap[p]ed person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury 
shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty 
is not imposed. 
 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570–71. 
75 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 743. 
76 See id. at 743–44. 
77 See id. at 744. 
78 See supra notes 44–68 and accompanying text. 
79 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752–58; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(describing the protection against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (describing the right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (describing the 
2013] PLEA BARGAINING'S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 13 
describe the type of bargains that would be acceptable
80
: 
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened 
physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.  But 
nothing of the sort is claimed in this case; nor is there evidence that Brady was so 
gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency that he did not or could not, 
with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the 
advantages of pleading guilty.
81
 
The Court continued: 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship 
to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).
82
 
After Brady, plea bargaining was permitted and could fully emerge into the 
mainstream of the American criminal justice system.
83
  As long as the plea 
was “voluntary,” which meant that it was not induced “by actual or 
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the 
defendant,” the bargain would be permitted.
84
 
Plea bargaining continued its rise over the next four decades and, 
today, over 96% of convictions in the federal system result from pleas of 
guilt rather than decisions by juries.
85
  While plea bargaining was a 
 
exclusionary rule); Dervan, supra note 26, at 81 (“[T]he Supreme Court imposed the 
‘exclusionary rule’ for violations of the Fourth Amendment, granted the right to counsel, and 
imposed the obligation that suspects be informed of their rights prior to being 
interrogated.”). 
80 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–51. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en 
banc), rev’d per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).  Interestingly, the language used by the 
Supreme Court in Brady is the same as language proposed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit several years earlier to address “voluntariness.”  See Shelton v. 
United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115, judgment set aside, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en 
banc), rev’d per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).  The Shelton case almost rose to the United 
States Supreme Court for review of the constitutionality of plea bargaining in 1958, but was 
surreptitiously withdrawn prior to argument after the government admitted that the guilty 
plea may have been improperly obtained.  See Dervan, supra note 26, at 73 (“According to 
Professor Albert Alschuler, evidence indicates that the government likely confessed its error 
for fear that the Supreme Court would finally make a direct ruling that all manner of plea 
bargaining was wholly unconstitutional.”). 
83 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–55. 
84 Id. at 750. 
85 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, fig.C, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_ 
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powerful force in 1970, the ability of prosecutors to create significant 
incentives for defendants to accept plea offers grew exponentially after 
Brady with the implementation of sentencing guidelines throughout much 
of the country.
86
  As one commentator explained, “By assigning a fixed and 
narrow penalty range to almost every definable offense, sentencing 
guidelines often empower prosecutors to dictate a defendant’s sentence by 
manipulating the charges.”
87
  Through charge selection and influence over 
sentencing ranges, prosecutors today possess striking powers to create 
significant sentencing differentials, a term used to describe the difference 
between the sentence a defendant faces if he or she pleads guilty versus the 
sentence risked if he or she proceeds to trial and is convicted.
88
  Many have 
 
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/FigureC.pdf. 
86 See FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, supra note 37, at 210 (“[Sentencing 
Guidelines] invest prosecutors with the power, moderated only by the risk of loss at trial, to 
dictate many sentences simply by choosing one set of charges over another.”); see also Mary 
Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on 
Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67 
(2006) (“Like most plea agreements in federal or state courts, the standard D.C. federal plea 
agreement starts by identifying the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty and the 
charges or potential charges that the government in exchange agrees not to prosecute.”); 
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from 
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 177 
(2004) (“The power of the prosecutor to charge is two-fold; the power to indict or not . . . 
and the power to decide what offenses to charge.”); Joy A. Boyd, Comment, Power, Policy, 
and Practice: The Department of Justice’s Plea Bargaining Policy as Applied to the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Power Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 
592 (2004) (“Not only may a prosecutor choose whether to pursue any given case, but she 
also decides which charges to file.”); Jon J. Lambiras, Comment, White-Collar Crime: Why 
the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 512 (2003) 
(“Charging decisions are a critical sentencing matter and are left solely to the discretion of 
the prosecutor.  When determining which charges to bring, prosecutors may often choose 
from more than one statutory offense.”). 
87 FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, supra note 37, at 17; see also Marc L. Miller, 
Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 
(2004) (“The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the 
Commission and the guidelines and mandatory penalties, is the virtually absolute power the 
system has given prosecutors over federal prosecution and sentencing.”); Boyd, supra note 
86, at 591–92 (“While the main focus of the Sentencing Guidelines appeared to be 
narrowing judicial discretion in sentencing, some critics argued that the Sentencing 
Guidelines merely shifted the federal judges’ discretionary power to federal prosecutors.”). 
88 See Alschuler, supra note 43, at 652–53.  Professor Alschuler stated, “Criminal 
defendants today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers primarily because they perceive that 
this action is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would follow conviction at trial.  A 
number of studies suggest that this perception is justified.”  Id. at 652–53.  Among the 
studies cited by Professor Alschuler in support of his statement are the following: MARVIN 
ZALMAN ET AL., SENTENCING IN MICHIGAN: REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN FELONY SENTENCING 
PROJECT 268 (1979) (noting that proceeding to trial tended to increase the probability of 
serving prison time); H. Joo Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing 
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surmised that the larger the sentencing differential, the greater the 
likelihood a defendant will forego his or her right to trial and accept the 
deal.
89
 
B. PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE DEBATE 
In 2004, Lea Fastow, wife of former Enron Chief Financial Officer 
 
and Parole Processes, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27, 31 (1973) (noting that defendants charged with 
robbery and felonious assault who proceeded to trial received sentences almost twice as long 
as those who pleaded guilty); Franklin E. Zimring et al., Punishing Homicide in 
Philadelphia: Perspectives on the Death Penalty, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 236 (1976) (noting 
that no homicide defendants who pleaded guilty received a sentence of life or death, as 
compared to 29% of those convicted at trial); Patrick R. Oster & Roger Simon, Jury Trial a 
Sure Way to Increase the Rap, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 17, 1973, at 4 (noting a disparity 
between sentences of murder defendants who pleaded guilty and those who proceeded to 
trial); see also Alschuler, supra note 43, at 653 n.2; Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values 
into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) (“The 
criminal justice system uses large sentence discounts to induce guilty pleas.  Of course these 
discounts exert pressure on defendants to plead guilty.”); Dervan, supra note 26, at 64 
(“[P]lea bargaining’s rise to dominance during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
resulted from prosecutors gaining increased power over the criminal justice system and, 
through such power, the ability to offer increasingly significant incentives to those willing to 
confess their guilt in court.”); Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror,  27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 245 (2011) (“Key to the 
success of prosecutors’ use of increasing powers to create incentives that attracted 
defendants was their ability to structure plea agreements that included significant differences 
between the sentence one received in return for pleading guilty and the sentence one risked if 
he or she lost at trial.”). 
89 One study analyzed robbery and burglary defendants in three California jurisdictions 
and found that defendants who went to trial received significantly higher sentences.  See 
David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing 
and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 55–59 (1981–1982); 
Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its 
Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (2000) (“The differential in sentencing 
between those who plead and those convicted after trial reflects the judgment that defendants 
who insist upon a trial are doing something blameworthy.”); Shin, supra note 88, at 27 
(finding that charge reduction directly results in reduction of the maximum sentence 
available and indirectly results in lesser actual time served); Tung Yin, Comment, Not a 
Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing 
Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 443 (1995) (“Curiously, the arena of 
plea bargaining pits the concepts of duress and consideration against each other: a large 
sentencing differential makes it more likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, 
and yet it also increases the benefit offered in exchange for the guilty plea.”).  The Brereton 
and Casper study stated:   
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when guilty plea rates are high, expect 
to find differential sentencing.  We believe that recent arguments to the effect that differentials 
are largely illusory do not withstand serious scrutiny, even though this revisionist challenge has 
been valuable in forcing us to examine more closely what is too often taken to be self-evidently 
true. 
Brereton & Casper, supra, at 89. 
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Andrew Fastow, was accused of engaging in six counts of criminal conduct 
related to the collapse of the Texas energy giant.
90
  Though conviction at 
trial under the original indictment carried a prison sentence of ten years 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the government offered Fastow a 
plea bargain.
91
  In return for assisting in their prosecution, she would be 
eligible for a mere five months in prison.
92
  With small children to consider 
and a husband who would certainly receive a lengthy prison sentence, 
Fastow accepted the offer.
93
  The question that remained, however, was 
whether Fastow had pleaded guilty because she had committed the alleged 
offenses, or whether the plea bargaining machine had become so powerful 
that even innocent or questionably guilty defendants were now becoming 
mired in its powerful grips.
94
 
 
90 See Indictment, United States v. Fastow, Cr.No. H-03- (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2003), 
available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usleafstw43003ind. 
pdf; see also Michelle S. Jacobs, Loyalty’s Reward—A Felony Conviction: Recent 
Prosecutions of High-Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 843 (2006); Mary 
Flood, Lea Fastow in Plea-Bargain Talks, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2003, at 1A. 
91 See Bruce Zucker, Settling Federal Criminal Cases in the Post-Enron Era: The Role of 
the Court and Probation Office in Plea Bargaining Federal White Collar Cases, 6 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2004).  The ten-year sentence is calculated using the 2002 
sentencing guidelines for fraud and the allegations contained in Fastow’s indictment.  Given 
an alleged loss amount of $17 million and more than fifty victims, Fastow, who had no prior 
criminal record, faced a sentencing range of 97–121 months. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 & ch. 5, pt. A (2002). 
92 See Zucker, supra note 91, at 3.  In Fastow’s eventual plea agreement, the prosecutors 
used a federal misdemeanor charge as a mechanism by which to ensure the judge could not 
sentence Fastow beyond the terms of the arrangement.  See Mary Flood, Fastows to Plead 
Guilty Today, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2004, at 1A. 
93 See Greg Farrell & Jayne O’Donnell, Plea Deals Appear Close for Fastows, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 8, 2004, § B, at 1 (“One of the reasons that Lea Fastow wants to limit her jail 
time to five months is that she and her husband have two young children, and they’re trying 
to structure their pleas so they’re not both in jail at the same time.”); see also Flood, supra 
note 92, at A1 (“The plea bargains for the Fastows, who said they wanted to be sure their 
two children are not left parentless, have been in limbo for more than a week.”).  
Interestingly, the judge in the case later rejected the government’s attempts to utilize a 
binding plea agreement containing the five-month offer.  See Farrell & O’Donnell, supra, 
§ B, at 1 (“U.S. District Judge David Hittner told Lea Fastow Wednesday that he refused to 
be locked in to the five-month prison sentence that her lawyers had negotiated with 
prosecutors.”).  In response, the government withdrew the original charges and allowed Lea 
Fastow to plead guilty to a single misdemeanor tax charge.  See New Plea Bargain for Lea 
Fastow in Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at C13.  The judge then sentenced her to 
one year in prison.  See Lea Fastow Enters Prison, CNNMONEY (July 12, 2004, 12:52 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/07/12/news/newsmakers/lea_fastow/index.htm. 
94 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 56 (“Today, the incentives to bargain are powerful 
enough to force even an innocent defendant to falsely confess guilt in hopes of leniency and 
in fear of reprisal.”); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 617, 628 (2011) (“[P]rosecutors can avoid having to test their theories at trial by using 
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It is unclear how many of the more than 96% of defendants who are 
convicted through pleas of guilt each year are actually innocent of the 
charged offenses, but it is clear that plea bargaining has an innocence 
problem.
95
  As Professor Russell D. Covey has stated, “When the deal is 
good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether 
one believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
regardless of whether one is factually innocent.”
96
  While almost all 
commentators agree with Covey’s statement that some innocent defendants 
will be induced to plead guilty, much debate exists regarding the extent of 
this phenomenon.
97
 
Some argue that plea bargaining’s innocence problem is significant 
 
significant leverage to virtually force even innocent, or at least questionably guilty, 
defendants to plead guilty.”). 
95 See Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the 
Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 295 (1975) (“[T]he pressure on defendants to plead 
guilty in the federal courts has induced a high rate of conviction by ‘consent’ in cases in 
which no conviction would have been obtained if there had been a contest.”); Robert E. Scott 
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1950–51 (1992) 
(discussing plea bargaining’s innocence problem); David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea 
Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 27 (1984); see also Covey, supra note 43, at 
74 (“Plea bargaining has an innocence problem.”); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea 
Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295–96 (2006) (arguing for a partial ban on plea 
bargaining to reduce the likelihood innocent defendants will plead guilty); Andrew D. 
Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1123, 1154 (2005). 
96 Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the 
Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 450 (2011) (“The risk of inaccurate results 
in the plea bargaining system thus seems substantial.”); see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea 
Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 148 (2011). 
That plea bargaining represents something of an affront to the rule against coerced confessions 
has been oft-noted and more often ignored.  The objections that have been leveled against plea 
bargaining are numerous and diverse, but most stem from a common problem: plea bargaining 
reduces the ability of the criminal justice system to avoid convicting the innocent.  
Gilchrist, supra, at 148; see also Gazal-Ayal, supra note 95, at 2306 (“In all these cases, an 
innocent defendant might accept the offer in order to avoid the risk of a much harsher result 
if he is convicted at trial, and thereby plea bargaining could very well lead to the conviction 
of factually innocent defendants.”); Leipold, supra note 95, at 1154 (“Yet we know that 
sometimes innocent people plead guilty, and we know some of the reasons why . . .  
[S]ometimes the prosecutor offers such a generous discount for admitting guilt that the 
defendant feels he simply can’t take the chance of going to trial.”). 
97 It is worth mentioning that even Joan of Arc and Galileo Galilei fell victim to the 
persuasions of plea bargaining.  See Alschuler, supra note 36, at 41 (“[Joan of Arc] 
demonstrated that even saints are sometimes unable to resist the pressures of plea 
negotiation.”); Kathy Swedlow, Pleading Guilty v. Being Guilty: A Case for Broader Access 
to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 575, 575 (2005) (describing Galileo’s 
decision to admit his belief in the theory that the earth was the center of the universe in 
return for a lighter sentence).  
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and brings into question the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice 
system.
98
  Professor Ellen S. Podgor wrote recently of plea bargaining, 
“[O]ur existing legal system places the risk of going to trial, and in some 
cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that innocence and guilt no 
longer become the real considerations.”
99
  But even for those who believe 
that plea bargaining leads to large numbers of innocent defendants pleading 
guilty, an uncertainty persists regarding exactly how susceptible innocent 
defendants are to bargained justice.
100
  This is troubling because it prevents 
an accurate assessment of what must be done in response to this potential 
injustice.
101
 
Others argue, however, that plea bargaining’s innocence problem is 
“exaggerated” and the likelihood of persuading an innocent defendant to 
falsely confess is minimal.
102
  This argument rests, in part, on a perception 
 
98 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 97 (“That plea-bargaining today has a significant 
innocence problem indicates that the Brady safety-valve has failed and, as a result, the 
constitutionality of modern day plea bargaining is in great doubt.”); Gilchrist, supra note 96, 
at 147 (“By failing to generate results correlated with the likely outcome at trial, plea 
bargaining undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”); F. Andrew Hessick 
III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the 
Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 197 (2002) (“While 
the concept of convicting an innocent person is a terrible imperfection of our justice system, 
an innocent person pleading guilty is inexcusable.”). 
99 Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2010); see also Covey, supra note 43, at 80 (“[A]s long as the 
prosecutor is willing and able to discount plea prices to reflect resource savings, regardless 
of guilt or innocence, pleading guilty is the defendant’s dominant strategy.  As a result, non-
frivolous accusation—not proof beyond a reasonable doubt—is all that is necessary to 
establish legal guilt.”). 
100 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 96–97 (discussing plea bargaining’s innocence 
problem, but acknowledging that the exact impact of bargained justice on innocent 
defendants is, as of yet, unknown); see also Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 
58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 631 (2005) (“The number of innocent defendants who accept 
bargained guilty pleas is uncertain.”). 
101 See Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1173 (2011) (“If the 
plea bargaining process is indeed a reasonable replacement for a trial, then plea bargaining 
should be encouraged . . .  On the other hand, if the results are dependent on factors 
unrelated to what would occur at trial, then society should work to reform, limit, or abolish 
the practice.”). 
102 See Shapiro, supra note 95, at 40 (“[Plea bargaining’s] defenders deny that the 
chances of convicting the innocent are substantial . . . .”); Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and 
the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 114 (2010) 
(“[I]f innocents tend to reject offers that guilty defendants accept, the concern over the 
innocence problem may be exaggerated.”); Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-
Bargaining and Prosecution 13 (European Ass’n of Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 013-
2009, 2009) (“Since trials are designed to reveal the truth, an innocent defendant would 
correctly estimate that his chances at trial are better than the prosecutor’s offer suggests.  As 
a result, innocent defendants tend to reject offers while guilty defendants tend to accept 
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that innocent defendants will reject prosecutors’ plea offers and instead will 
proceed to trial backed by the belief that their factual innocence will protect 
them from conviction.
103
  One commentator noted that supporters of the 
plea-bargaining system believe “[p]lea agreements are not forced on 
defendants . . . they are only an option.  Innocent defendants are likely to 
reject this option because they expect an acquittal at trial.”
104
 
Such skeptics are in good company.  Even the Supreme Court in its 
landmark Brady decision permitting bargained justice rejected concerns that 
innocent defendants would falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.
105
  
The Court stated: 
We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by 
offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by 
competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.  But our view is to the 
contrary and is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas 
of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with 
adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and 
reliability of the defendants’ admissions that they committed the crimes with which 
they are charged.
106
 
This sentiment was expressed by the Court again eight years later in 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.
107
  In Bordenkircher, the Court stated that as long 
as the defendant is free to accept or reject a plea bargain, it is unlikely an 
innocent defendant will be “driven to false self-condemnation.”
108
  Even 
those who argue that plea bargaining’s innocence problem is exaggerated, 
however, rely mainly on speculation regarding how innocent defendants 
will respond in such situations.
109
 
 
them.”); see also Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1165 
(2008). 
When an innocent defendant rationally chooses to plead guilty, the system should want to protect 
access.  It should recognize that at least for the innocent defendant it is not bad that some deals 
are more than just sensible—they would be improvident to reject.  Particularly where process 
costs are high and the consequences of conviction low, a bargained-for conviction of an innocent 
accused is no evil; it is the constructive minimization thereof—an unpleasant medicine softening 
the symptoms of separate affliction. 
Bowers, supra, at 1165. 
103 See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 95, at 2298. 
104 See id. 
105 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1970). 
106 Id. at 758. 
107 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
108 Id. at 363 (“Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily 
implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense 
simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.”). 
109 See supra notes 102–104 and infra notes 111–123 and accompanying text. 
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The need by both sides of the innocence debate to gather more data 
regarding the extent to which innocent defendants might be vulnerable to 
the persuasive power of plea bargaining has led to numerous studies.
110
  
Several legal scholars have conducted examinations of exoneration statistics 
in an effort to identify examples where innocent defendants were convicted 
by guilty pleas.
111
  Professor Samuel Gross conducted one of the most 
comprehensive studies in 2005.
112
  While Professor Gross’s research 
explored exonerations in the United States broadly, he also specifically 
discussed plea bargaining’s innocence problem.
113
  His study stated that 
twenty of 340 exonerees had pleaded guilty.
114
  Although Professor Gross 
found a relatively low number among those exonerated who falsely pleaded 
guilty, there are significant limitations to using this study to disprove the 
innocence problem surrounding guilty pleas.
115
  Upon closer examination of 
this and other exoneration studies, one realizes that while exoneration data 
is vital to our understanding of wrongful convictions generally, it cannot 
accurately or definitively explain how likely innocent defendants are to 
 
110 See infra note 111. 
111 See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 34, at 296–98 (discussing plea bargaining’s 
innocence problem in England); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55, 74 (2008) (noting that nine of the first two hundred individuals exonerated by the 
Innocence Project had pleaded guilty); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United 
States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524, 536 (2005) (examining 
the number of persons exonerated who pleaded guilty); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents 
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778–79 (2007) (examining DNA exonerations for capital rape–murder 
convictions); George C. Thomas III, Two Windows into Innocence, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
575, 577–78 (2010) (“McConville and Baldwin concluded that two percent of the guilty 
pleas were of doubtful validity.  As there were roughly two million felony cases filed in 
2006, if two percent result in conviction of an innocent defendant, 40,000 wrongful felony 
convictions occur per year.”). 
112 See Gross et al., supra note 111, at 523. 
113 See id. at 524, 536. 
114 Id. (observing that of this number, fifteen were murder defendants, four were rape 
defendants, and one was a gun-possession defendant facing life in prison as a habitual 
offender).  Professor Gross goes on to note that in two cases of mass exoneration involving 
police misconduct, a subset of cases not included in his study, a significant number of the 
defendants pleaded guilty.  See id. (“By contrast, thirty-one of the thirty-nine Tulia 
defendants pled guilty to drug offenses they did not commit, as did the majority of the 100 or 
more exonerated defendants in the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles.”). 
115 See Howe, supra note 100, at 631 (“Particularly if many innocent defendants who go 
to trial are acquitted, [Professor Gross’s] figure does not support claims that innocent 
defendants are generally more risk averse regarding trials than factually guilty defendants or 
that prosecutors frequently persuade innocent defendants with irresistibly low plea offers.”).  
Howe goes on, however, to caution those who might rely on this study in such a manner 
because of the difficulty in gaining an exoneration following a guilty plea as opposed to 
following a conviction by trial.  See id. 
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plead guilty.
116
 
As noted by other scholars in the field, three problems exist with 
exoneration data when applied to plea-bargaining research.
117
  First, 
exoneration data predominantly focuses on serious felony cases such as 
murder or rape where there is available DNA evidence and where the 
defendants’ sentences are lengthy enough for the exoneration process to 
work its way through the system.
118
  This means that exoneration data does 
not examine the role of innocence and plea bargaining in the vast majority 
of criminal cases, those not involving murder or rape, including 
misdemeanor cases.
119
  Second, because many individuals who plead guilty 
do so in return for a reduced sentence, it is highly likely that innocent 
defendants who plead guilty have little incentive or insufficient time to 
pursue exoneration.
120
  Finally, even if some innocent defendants who 
pleaded guilty had the desire and time to move for exoneration, many 
would be prohibited from challenging their convictions by the mere fact 
that they had pleaded guilty.
121
  As such, innocent defendants who plead 
guilty are not accurately captured by the exoneration data sets and, 
 
116 See Howe, supra note 100, at 631; Russell Covey, Mass Exoneration Data and the 
Causes of Wrongful Convictions 1 (Aug. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=1881767. 
117 See Howe, supra note 100, at 631; Covey, supra note 116, at 1. 
118 See Covey, supra note 116, at 1 (“[The post-conviction testing of DNA] dataset has 
significant limitations, chief of which is that it is largely limited to the kinds of cases in 
which DNA evidence is available for post-conviction testing.”). 
119 The Federal Bureau of Investigation crime statistics indicate that in 2010 there were 
1,246,248 violent crimes and 9,082,887 property crimes in the United States.  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, F.B.I., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, at tbl.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.2010/tables/10tb 
l01.xls.  Of this number, murder accounted for 1.2% and forcible rape accounted for 6.8% of 
the violent crimes.  See id.  Further, in 2011, the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Attorneys released a report regarding misdemeanor cases in Florida.  See SMITH & MADDAN, 
supra note 67.  The report noted that nearly a half-million misdemeanor cases are filed in 
Florida each year, and over 70% of those cases are resolved with a guilty plea at 
arraignment.  See id. at 10. 
120 See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful 
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 834–35 
(2010). 
121 See JH Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Post-
Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 50–52 
(2010) (discussing restrictions on the ability of defendants who pleaded guilty to utilize 
postconviction DNA testing); see also Howe, supra note 100, at 631 (“Those relying on 
[Professor Gross’s] study, however, should do so cautiously.  The proportion of false 
convictions due to guilty pleas probably exceeds the exoneration figure from the study, 
because pleading guilty, as opposed to being convicted after trial, likely makes subsequent 
exoneration more difficult.”). 
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therefore, it is highly likely that the true extent of plea bargaining’s 
innocence problem is significantly underestimated by these studies.
122
  
Consequently, one must look elsewhere to determine the true likelihood that 
an innocent defendant might falsely condemn himself in return for an offer 
of leniency in the form of a plea bargain.
123
 
One such source of information are psychological studies regarding 
plea bargaining and the decisionmaking processes of defendants in the 
criminal justice system.
124
  Unfortunately, these studies are also problematic 
and fail to resolve definitively plea bargaining’s innocence debate because 
the majority merely employ vignettes in which participants are asked to 
imagine themselves as guilty or innocent and faced with a hypothetical 
decision regarding whether to accept or reject a plea offer.
125
  As a result of 
the utilization of such imaginary and hypothetical scenarios, these studies 
are unable to capture either the full impact of a defendant’s knowledge that 
she is factually innocent or the true gravity of the choices she must make 
when standing before the criminal justice system accused of a crime she did 
 
122 Even Professor Gross acknowledges that his study fails to capture many innocent 
defendants who plead guilty.  In concluding his discussion regarding the Tulia and Rampart 
mass exoneration cases, he notes that these cases received attention because they involved 
large-scale police corruption.  He goes on to state, “If these same defendants had been 
falsely convicted of the same crimes by mistake—or even because of unsystematic acts of 
deliberate dishonesty—we would never have known.”  Gross et al., supra note 111, at 537; 
see also Allison D. Redlich & Asil Ali Özdoğru, Alford Pleas in the Age of Innocence, 27 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 467, 468 (2009) (“Determining the prevalence of innocents is 
methodologically challenging, if not impossible.  There is no litmus test to definitively 
determine who is innocent and who is guilty.  Exonerations are long, costly, and arduous 
processes; efforts towards them are often unsuccessful for reasons having little to do with 
guilt or innocence.”). 
123 See infra notes 124–140 (discussing psychological studies of plea bargaining). 
124 The majority of psychological studies to date have only looked at the phenomenon 
from the perspective of the attorney and his or her decisionmaking process.  See Vanessa A. 
Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous 
Representation Apply Equally to All?,  35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 413 (2011); see also 
Greg M. Kramer et al., Plea Bargaining Recommendations by Criminal Defense Attorneys: 
Evidence Strength, Potential Sentence, and Defendant Preference, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 573, 
573 (2007); Hunter A. McAllister & Norman J. Bregman, Plea Bargaining by Prosecutors 
and Defense Attorneys: A Decision Theory Approach, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 686, 686 
(1986). 
125 See Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened 
Punishment, and Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 63–65 (1984) (discussing the methodology of the study); W. Larry 
Gregory et al., Social Psychology and Plea Bargaining: Applications, Methodology, and 
Theory, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1521, 1522–28 (1978) (discussing the 
methodology of the study); Tor et al., supra note 102, at 103–09 (discussing the 
methodology of the study).  
2013] PLEA BARGAINING'S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 23 
not commit.
126
  Nevertheless, these studies do offer some preliminary 
insights into the world of the innocent defendant’s dilemma. 
One of the first psychological studies attempting to understand a 
defendant’s plea-bargaining decisionmaking process through the use of 
vignettes was conducted by Professors Larry Gregory, John Mowen, and 
Darwyn Linder in 1984 (Gregory study).
127
  In the Gregory study, students 
were asked to “imagine that they were innocent or guilty of having 
committed an armed robbery.”
128
  The students were then presented with 
the evidence against them and asked to make a decision regarding whether 
they would plead guilty or proceed to trial.
129
  As might be expected, the 
study revealed that students imagining themselves to be guilty were 
significantly more likely to plead guilty than those who were imagining 
themselves to be innocent.
130
  In the experiment, 18% of the “innocent” 
students and 83% of the “guilty” students pleaded guilty.
131
  While these 
results might lend support to the argument that few innocent defendants in 
the criminal justice system falsely condemn themselves—if you can 
consider 18% to be an insignificant number—the study suffered from its 
utilization of hypotheticals.
132
  As has been shown in social psychological 
studies for decades, what people say they will do in a hypothetical situation 
 
126 See supra note 125.  
127 See Gregory et al., supra note 125. 
128 Id. at 1522.  The Gregory study involved 143 students.  Interestingly, the study only 
utilized male participants.  The study stated, “Since most armed robberies are committed by 
men, only male students were used.”  Id.  The methodological explanation went on to 
describe the particulars of the study: 
After listening to a tape recording of their defense attorney’s summary of the evidence that 
would be presented for and against them at their trial, students opened an experimental booklet 
that contained information about the charges against them (four versus one), the punishment they 
would face if convicted (ten to fifteen years in prison versus one to two years in prison), and the 
details of the plea bargain that was offered them.  Students then indicated whether they accepted 
or rejected the plea bargain, responded to manipulation checks, indicated their perceived 
probability of conviction, and indicated how sure their defense attorney and the judge were of 
their innocence or guilt.  
Id. 
129 Id.  The study also discussed the results of different students facing differing 
punishments and numbers of charges.  The study found that the severity of punishment and 
the number of charges only affected the guilty condition, not the innocent condition.  Those 
in the guilty condition behaved as would be expected: most likely to accept a plea with a 
large number of charges and a severe penalty attached (100%), and least likely with a few 
number of charges and a low penalty attached (63%).  The innocent defendants had a low 
rate of plea bargaining regardless of condition (11%–33%).  Id. at 1524, tbl.1. 
130 See id. at 1524–26. 
131 See id. 
132 See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
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and what they would do in reality are two very different things.
133
 
Perhaps acknowledging the unreliable nature of a study relying merely 
on vignettes to explore such an important issue, Gregory attempted to create 
a more realistic innocent defendant’s dilemma in a subsequent 
experiment.
134
  In the study, students were administered a “difficult exam 
after being given prior information by a confederate that most of the 
answers were ‘B’ (guilty condition) or after being given no information 
(innocent condition).”
135
  After the test, the students were accused of the 
“crime” of having prior knowledge of the answers and told they would have 
to appear before an ethics committee.
136
  The participants were then offered 
a plea bargain that required their immediate admission of guilt in return for 
a less severe punishment.
137
  Unfortunately, the second study was only 
successfully administered to sixteen students, too few to draw any 
significant conclusions.
138
  Nevertheless, Gregory was finally on the right 
path to answering the lingering question pervading plea bargaining’s 
innocence debate.  How likely is it that an innocent defendant might falsely 
plead guilty to a crime he or she did not commit?
139
 
III. LABORATORY EVIDENCE OF PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE 
PROBLEM 
In 2006, a wave of new accounting scandals pervaded the American 
corporate landscape.
140
  According to federal prosecutors, numerous 
companies were backdating stock options for senior executives to increase 
compensation without disclosing such expenses to the public as required by 
 
133 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: 
Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 246 (1977). 
134 See Gregory et al., supra note 125, at 1526–27. 
135 Id. at 1526. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. at 1528.  The results of the second study by Gregory and colleagues were that 
six of eight guilty students accepted the deal and zero of eight innocent students accepted the 
deal.  See id.  These findings led to further research regarding the effect of an innocent 
defendant’s belief that he or she would succeed at trial.  In their work regarding fairness and 
plea negotiations, Tor, Gazal-Ayal, and Garcia showed that “guilty” participants were more 
likely to accept a plea than the “innocent” participants.  See Tor et al., supra note 102, at 
113–14. 
139 See infra Part IV (discussing the results of the authors’ plea-bargaining study). 
140 Companies including Broadcom, Brocade Communications, McAfee, and Comverse 
Technologies were targeted by the government during the stock options backdating 
investigations.  See Peter J. Henning, How the Broadcom Backdating Case Went Awry, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 15, 2009, 1:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/ 
14/how-the-broadcom-backdating-case-has-gone-awry/. 
2013] PLEA BARGAINING'S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 25 
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.
141
  Prosecutors alleged 
that one such company was Broadcom, a large semiconductor manufacturer 
in California.
142
  After Broadcom restated $2.2 billion in charges because of 
backdating in January 2007, the government indicted Dr. Henry Samueli, 
cofounder and former Chief Technical Officer of the company.
143
  Dr. 
Samueli pleaded guilty and, as part of his deal, agreed to testify for the 
prosecution against Henry T. Nicholas III, Broadcom’s other cofounder, 
and William J. Ruehle, the company’s Chief Financial Officer.
144
  After Dr. 
Samueli offered his testimony at trial, however, U.S. District Judge Cormac 
J. Carney voided Dr. Samueli’s guilty plea, dismissed the charges against 
all the defendants, and called the prosecutors’ actions a “shameful” 
campaign of intimidation.
145
  The judge stated in open court that “there was 
no evidence at trial to suggest that Dr. Samueli did anything wrong, let 
alone criminal.  Yet, the government embarked on a campaign of 
intimidation and other misconduct to embarrass him and bring him down.”  
The judge went on to state, “One must conclude that the government 
engaged in this misconduct to pressure Dr. Samueli to falsely admit guilt 
and incriminate [the other defendants] or, if he was unwilling to make such 
a false admission and incrimination, to destroy Dr. Samueli’s credibility as 
a witness for [the other defendants].”
146
  With this unusual public rebuke of 
 
141 See Events in the Broadcom Backdating Case, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/16/business/la-fi-broadcom-timeline16-2009dec16 
(“Stock options, typically used as incentive pay, allow employees to buy stock in the future 
at current prices.  Broadcom Corp. and other companies also backdated the options to a 
previously lower price to give employees a little extra when they cashed in the options.”). 
142 See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 940–
41 (2010) (discussing the Broadcom case); Ribstein, supra note 94, at 630 (discussing the 
Broadcom case). 
143 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Broadcom Co-Founder Pleads Guilty to Making 
False Statement to the SEC in Backdating Investigation (June 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2008/086.html. 
144 See Stuart Pfeifer & E. Scott Reckard, Judge Throws Out Stock Fraud Charges 
Against Broadcom Co-Founder, Ex-CFO, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A16; see also 
Indictment, United States v. Nicholas, SA CR 08-00139 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2008), available 
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/broadcom_nicholasruehlein 
dictment.pdf. 
145 See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 5195, United States v. Ruehle, No. SACR 
08-00139-CJC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings, Ruehle] 
(“Based on the complete record now before me, I find that the Government has intimidated 
and improperly influenced the three witnesses critical to Mr. Ruehle’s defense.  The 
cumulative effect of that misconduct has distorted the truth-finding process and 
compromised the integrity of the trial.”). 
146 Id. at 5197–99 (“Needless to say, the government’s treatment of Dr. Samueli was 
shameful and contrary to American values of decency and justice.”); see also Michael 
Hilzik, Judicial System Takes a Hit in Broadcom Case, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at B3 
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the prosecutorial tactics that forced an innocent defendant into a plea 
bargain, the judge in the Broadcom case demonstrated once again the 
existence of the innocent defendant’s dilemma.
147
 
While the Gregory study attempted to capture the likelihood that an 
innocent defendant such as Dr. Samueli might falsely plead guilty, the 
study’s utilization of hypotheticals prevented it from offering an accurate 
glimpse inside the mind of the accused.
148
  Shortly before the Broadcom 
prosecution, however, a study regarding police interrogation tactics 
utilizing an experimental design similar to Gregory’s second study offered a 
path forward for plea bargaining’s innocence inquiry.
149
  In 2005, 
Professors Melissa Russano, Christian Meissner, Fadia Narchet, and Saul 
Kassin initiated a study (Russano study) in which students were accused by 
a research assistant of working together after being instructed this was 
 
(noting that in an attempt to pressure defendant Nicholas, the government had “threatened to 
force Nicholas’ [thirteen]-year-old son to testify about his father and drugs”).  Judge Carney 
listed some of the prosecution’s misconduct as the following: 
 Among other wrongful acts, the Government, one, unreasonably demanded that Dr. Samueli 
submit to as many as 30 grueling interrogations by the lead prosecutor. 
 Two, falsely stated and improperly leaked to the media that Dr. Samueli was not cooperating 
in the Government’s investigation. 
 Three, improperly pressured Broadcom to terminate Dr. Samueli’s employment and remove 
him from the board. 
 Four, misled Dr. Samueli into believing that the lead prosecutor would be replaced because of 
misconduct. 
 Five, obtained an inflammatory indictment that referred to Dr. Samueli 72 times and accused 
him of being an unindicted coconspirator when the government knew, or should have known, 
that he did nothing wrong. 
 And six, crafted an unconscionable plea agreement pursuant to which Dr. Samueli would 
plead guilty to a crime he did not commit and pay a ridiculous sum of $12 million to the United 
States Treasury.   
Transcript of Proceedings, Ruehle, supra note 145, at 5198. 
147 See Koehler, supra note 142, at 941 (“In pleading guilty, Samueli did what a 
‘disturbing number of other people have done: pleaded guilty to a crime they didn’t commit 
or at least believed they didn’t commit’ for fear of exercising their constitutional right to a 
jury trial, losing, and ‘getting stuck with a long prison sentence.’” (citation omitted)); 
Ribstein, supra note 94, at 630 (“In the Broadcom backdating case, particularly egregious 
prosecutorial conduct caused defendants to plead guilty to crimes they knew they had not 
committed . . . .”); Ashby Jones, Are Too Many Defendants Pressured into Pleading Guilty?, 
WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2009, 8:50 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/12/21/are-
too-many-defendants-pressured-into-pleading-guilty/ (“Samueli did what lawyers and legal 
scholars fear a disturbing number of other people have done: pleaded guilty to a crime either 
they didn’t commit or at least believed they didn’t commit.”). 
148 See supra notes 127 and 133 and accompanying text. 
149 See Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions with a Novel 
Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481 (2005). 
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prohibited.
150
  Some of the students accused of this form of “cheating” 
were, in fact, guilty of the charge, while others were not.
151
  Russano 
wanted to test the effect of two types of police interrogation on the rates of 
guilty and innocent suspects confessing to the alleged crime.
152
  The first 
interrogation tactic utilized to exact admissions from the students was 
minimization.
153
  Minimization is the process by which interrogators 
minimize the seriousness and anticipated consequences of the suspect’s 
conduct.
154
  The second interrogation tactic utilized to exact admissions 
from the students involved offering the students a “deal.”
155
  Students were 
told that if they confessed, the matter would be resolved quickly and they 
would merely be required to return to retake the test at a later date.
156
  If the 
students rejected the offer, the consequences were unknown and would be 
decided later by the course’s professor.
157
  Russano found that utilizing 
these tactics together, 43% of students falsely confessed and 87% of 
students truthfully confessed.
158
  When only the “deal” was offered, 
however, only 14% of the students in Russano’s study falsely confessed.
159
 
 
150 See id. at 481. 
151 See id. at 482 (“In the current paradigm, participants were accused of breaking an 
experimental rule, an act that was later characterized as ‘cheating.’”). 
152 See id. at 481 (“In the first demonstration of this paradigm, we explored the influence 
of two common police interrogation tactics: minimization and an explicit offer of leniency, 
or a ‘deal.’”). 
153 See id. at 482. 
154 See id. 
Researchers have categorized the interrogation methods promoted by interrogation manuals into 
two general types, namely, maximization and minimization.  Maximization involves so-called 
scare tactics designed to intimidate suspects: confronting them with accusations of guilt, refusing 
to accept their denials and claims of innocence, and exaggerating the seriousness of the situation.  
This approach may also include presenting fabricated evidence to support the accusation of guilt 
(e.g., leading suspects to think that their fingerprints were lifted from the murder weapon).  In 
contrast, minimization encompasses strategies such as minimizing the seriousness of the offense 
and the perceived consequences of confession, and gaining the suspect’s trust by offering 
sympathy, understanding, and face-saving excuses.  
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
155 See id. 
156 See id. at 483. 
157 See id. (“They were also told that if they did not agree to sign the statement, the 
experimenter would have to call the professor into the laboratory, and the professor would 
handle the situation as he saw fit, with the strong implication being that the consequences 
would likely be worse if the professor became further involved.”). 
158 See id. at 484. 
159 See id. 
Condition      True Confessions      False Confessions 
No Tactic 46% 6% 
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In 2011, utilizing the Russano study as a guide, we constructed a new 
investigatory paradigm that would better reflect the mechanics of the 
criminal justice system and more precisely focus the inquiry on the innocent 
defendant’s dilemma.
160
  The new study was administered to eighty-two 
students from a small, southeastern, private technical university.
161
  The 
results of the study were significant and established what Gregory and 
Russano had hinted at in their earlier forays into the plea-bargaining 
machine.
162
 
A. STUDY METHODOLOGY—CONFRONTING A DEVIL’S 
BARGAIN 
Participants in the study were all college students at a small technical 
university in the southeastern United States.
163
  The study participants had 
each signed up for what they believed was a psychological inquiry into 
individual versus group problem-solving performance.  When a study 
participant arrived for the problem-solving experiment, he or she was met 
by another student pretending to be participating in the exercise also.  
Unbeknownst to the study participant, however, the second student was 
actually a confederate working with the authors.
164
  At this point, a research 
assistant, also working with the authors, led the two students into a private 
room and explained the testing procedures.
165
  The research assistant 
 
Deal 72% 14% 
Minimization                   81% 18% 
Minimization + Deal       87% 43% 
Id. at tbl.1. 
160 See infra Part III.B (discussing the results of the authors’ plea-bargaining study). 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 See Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Pleading Innocents: Laboratory 
Evidence of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem 9 (2012) (unpublished short research 
report) (on file with authors).  The study was administered to eighty-two students.  Id.  Six 
students were removed from the study because of their suspicion as to the study’s actual 
focus, an inability to complete the study, or a refusal to assist the confederate when asked to 
render assistance in answering the questions.  Id.  Thus, seventy-six participants remained.  
Id.  Of this number, thirty-one indicated they were female and forty-five indicated they were 
male.  Id.  Of the study population, 52.6% identified as Caucasian, 21.1% identified as 
African-American, 13.2% identified as Hispanic, 5.3% identified as Asian, and 7.9% 
identified as “Other.”  Id. at 10.  Forty-eight students identified themselves as U.S. citizens, 
while twenty-eight students identified themselves as non-U.S. citizens.  Id.   
164 See id.  Two female students served as confederates in the study.  One was twenty 
years of age and the other was twenty-one years of age.   
165 See id.  Two research assistants were used in this experiment.  One research assistant 
was a twenty-seven-year-old male.  The other was a twenty-four-year-old female.   
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informed the students that they would be participating in an experiment 
about performance on logic problems.  According to the research assistant, 
the two students would be left alone to complete three logic problems 
together as a team.
166
  The research assistant then informed them that after 
the first problems were completed, the students would receive three 
additional logic problems that must be completed individually.  When these 
problems were distributed, the research assistant’s script required the 
following statement, “Now I will hand out the individual problems, 
remember that you are to work alone.  I will give you 15 minutes to 
complete these.” 
While the study participant and the confederate were solving the 
individual logic problems, one of two conditions would occur.  In half of 
the cases, the confederate asked the study participant for assistance in 
answering the questions, a clear violation of the research assistant’s explicit 
instructions.  First, the confederate asked the study participant, “What did 
you get for number 2?”  If the study participant did not respond with the 
answer, the confederate followed up by saying, “I think it is ‘D’ because 
[some scripted reasoning based on the specifics of the problem].”  Finally, 
if necessary, the confederate would ask, “Did you get ‘E’ for # 3?”
167
  It is 
worth noting that all but two study participants asked by the confederate to 
offer assistance violated the requirement that each student work alone.
168
  
Those study participants offering assistance were placed in the “guilty 
condition,” because they had “cheated” by violating the research assistant’s 
instructions.  In the other half of the cases, the confederate sat quietly and 
did not ask the study participant for assistance.
169
  The study participants in 
 
166 See Application by Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan to the Florida Institute 
of Technology Institutional Review Board, The Function of Sentence Disparity on Plea 
Negotations 16 (Nov. 3, 2009) (on file with authors). The research script required the 
research assistants to make the following statement during the introduction: 
We are studying the performance of individuals versus groups on logic problems.  You will be 
given three logic problems to work through together and then three problems to work through on 
your own.  It is very important that you work on the individual problems alone.  You have 15 
minutes for each set of problems.  Even if you run out of time, you must circle an answer for 
each question.  First, you’ll be working on the group problems.  I will leave the room and be 
back in 15 minutes.  If you finish before that time, one of you can duck your head out the door 
and let me know.  
Id. 
167 See id. at 20.  The study protocols also instructed the confederate that “[i]f they [the 
study participant] refuse after this prodding, stop asking and record (on the demographic 
sheet, at the end of the study) that the individual was in the cheat condition but refused to 
cheat.  Give specific points explaining what you tried to do to instigate the cheating.”  Id. 
168 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 10.  The two students who refused to offer 
assistance were removed from the study. 
169 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 166, at 20.  The study protocol stated: 
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this scenario were placed in the “innocent condition,” because they had not 
“cheated” by violating the research assistant’s instructions. 
After completing the second set of logic problems, the research 
assistant, who did not know whether cheating had occurred, collected the 
logic problems and asked that the students remain in the room for a few 
minutes while the problems were graded.
170
  Approximately five minutes 
later, the research assistant reentered the room and said, “We have a 
problem.  I’m going to need to speak with each of you individually.”  The 
research assistant looked at the sign-in sheet and read off the confederate’s 
name and the two then left the room together.  Five minutes later, the 
research assistant reentered the room, sat down near the student, and made 
the following statement. 
You and the other student had the same wrong answer on the second and third 
individual questions.  The chances of you both getting the exact same wrong answer 
are really small—in fact they are like less than 4%—because of this, when this occurs, 
we are required to report it to the professor in charge and she may consider this a form 
of academic dishonesty.171 
In early trials of the study design, it was determined that study 
participants did not understand how getting the same wrong answer on 
questions two and three indicated they may have cheated.  As a result, there 
was a perception that no actual evidence of guilt existed.  Because actual 
criminal trials involve evidence of guilt, even trials where the individual is 
actually innocent, it was determined that the study would more accurately 
capture the criminal process if one piece of evidence leading to the 
accusation was explained.  Therefore, as described above, the subject was 
informed that statistically, given that there were five available choices for 
each question, there was only a 4% chance that the students provided the 
same incorrect answers by coincidence.  This explanation of the logic 
behind the research assistant’s accusation certainly did not mean the subject 
was guilty.  To the contrary, the research assistant actually noted that there 
 
Do not speak to the participant and do not respond if they ask for assistance. 
Be sure that the participant cannot see what answers you are choosing—he/she needs to believe 
that you both answered two questions the same way and if they see your paper they may know 
that this was not the case.  We need to make sure that no matter what, cheating does NOT occur 
in this condition.  
Id. 
170 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 10–11.  The research assistants were not 
informed of whether cheating had occurred to ensure that their approach to each study 
participant—during the plea-bargaining component of the study—was consistent and not 
influenced by omnipotent knowledge of guilt or innocence that would not be available to a 
prosecutor or investigator in the actual criminal justice system.   
171 Id. at 11. 
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was a 4% chance there was no cheating.  As with all studies of this nature, 
difficult decisions must be made in an effort to create as realistic an 
environment as possible.  While some might argue that mentioning the 
statistical evidence leading to the accusation might lead to a perception of 
an overly strong case against the study participant, it was decided that the 
benefits of explaining the reasoning for the charge outweighed any potential 
influence this data might have on the study results.
172
 
To ensure the study participant was unable to argue that he had 
answered questions two and three correctly, the second set of logic 
questions were designed to have no correct answer.  The research assistant 
then informed the student that this had occurred before and she had been 
given authority to offer two alternatives.
173
  The first alternative the 
research assistant offered was a “plea” in which the study participant would 
be required to admit he or she cheated and, as punishment, would lose all 
compensation promised for participating in the experiment.
174
  This 
particular offer was made to all study participants and was constructed to be 
akin to an offer of probation or time served in the actual criminal justice 
system.
175
  The research assistant then offered each study participant one of 
 
172 This conclusion was reached for several reasons.  First, an actual criminal case should 
not reach the trial stage without at least one piece of significant evidence or a multitude of 
smaller pieces of evidence.  As such, in designing the study, we did not believe offering this 
single piece of evidence would unduly influence the subject’s decisionmaking or 
unreasonably influence the study’s results.  Second, it is difficult in a short study to build the 
same, often complex, foundation that is inherent in a criminal case.  To rectify this inherent 
design limitation, we devised one simple piece of evidence to explain the basis for the 
accusation.  The offered explanation, however, did leave room for the possibility that the 
individual was innocent, thus allowing the subject an argument upon which to rely in 
professing their innocence during the plea-negotiation process or during a trial before the 
ARB.  Third, even though many innocent defendants may not be confronted with as strong 
an indicator of guilt, it does not change the fact that any innocent defendant, no matter the 
evidence, necessarily falls within the margins of a case where there is evidence pointing to 
guilt, but the defendant is, in fact, innocent.  Even if our margin is smaller than most, the 
argument could be made that it does not change the fact that the person is innocent and, 
according to many commentators, should be motivated to maintain that innocence and 
proceed to trial.  
173 See id.  The research assistants also informed the study participants that this situation 
had arisen before and that the described protocol must be followed or the research assistants 
might lose their research positions. 
174 See id. at 12. The compensation offered for participating in the study was research 
participation credit—something required for students to successfully complete their 
Introduction to Psychology course. 
175 See id.; see also Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136–37. 
The trial course is long; even if convicted, the defendant often has already served any 
postconviction sentence, and then some.  In this way, conviction may counterintuitively 
inaugurate freedom.  Moreover, the costs of conviction are minimal; an additional misdemeanor 
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two alternative options if the plea offer was rejected. 
In roughly half of the cases (referred to as the “harsh sentencing 
condition”), the research assistant informed the student that if the “deal” 
was not accepted, the professor leading the experiment would bring the 
matter before the Academic Review Board (ARB).  The research assistant 
explained that the ARB was a group of ten to twelve faculty and staff 
members that ruled on such matters.  To make the ARB sound similar to a 
jury in an actual criminal trial, the research assistant described it as being a 
forum in which the student had the option of telling his or her version of 
events, presenting evidence, and arguing for his or her position.  Again, to 
better reflect the actual mechanics of the criminal justice system, the 
research assistant also informed the student that “the majority of students, 
like 80–90%, are usually found guilty” before the ARB.  This percentage 
was selected and communicated because it is consistent with the actual 
current conviction rate of defendants proceeding to trial in the United 
States.
176
  While it is impossible to predict how common it is for defense 
counsel to relate such statistics to their clients, we believed that this 
information would, at a minimum, be considered by counsel during their 
own assessment of the case and in preparing to advise their clients of the 
risks and rewards of each option.  As such, we felt it important to offer this 
information to the participants in this study to utilize during their personal 
assessment processes.  The research assistant then informed the student that 
if he or she were “convicted” by the ARB, she would lose her study 
compensation, her faculty advisor would be notified, and she would have to 
enroll in an ethics course that met for three hours each week during the 
semester.  The course was described as a pass/fail class that would be 
offered free of charge, but it would require mandatory weekly attendance 
and the completion of a paper and a final examination. 
In roughly the other half of the cases (referred to as the “lenient 
sentencing condition”), the research assistant provided the same 
information to the student regarding the ARB process, but informed the 
student that if he was “convicted” by the ARB, he would lose his study 
 
conviction does little to further mar an already-soiled record because the recidivist defendant has 
already suffered most of the corollary consequences that typically stem from convictions.  If the 
defendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the 
whole punishment.  Any plea that frees this defendant may be more than advisable—it may be 
salvation.  No matter how certain of acquittal, she is better off pleading guilty.  She is the 
defendant who benefits most from plea bargaining, and she is the very defendant who most 
frequently is innocent in fact.   
Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136–37 (footnotes omitted). 
176 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 12; see also Gregory et al., supra note 125, 
at 1529. 
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compensation, his faculty advisor would be notified, and he would undergo 
nine hours of ethics training in the form of three three-hour seminars.  The 
seminars were described as free of charge but requiring mandatory 
attendance and the completion of a final examination.  Half the students 
were offered the harsh sentencing condition and the other half were offered 
the lenient sentencing condition to test the impact of “sentencing 
differentials” on the rate of innocent and guilty students accepting the plea 
offer rather than proceeding to trial before the ARB. 
Once the study participants were presented with their options of 
pleading guilty or proceeding to the ARB, the research assistant presented 
them each with a piece of paper.  The paper outlined their options and asked 
that they circle their selection.
177
  To ensure study participants did not 
become distraught under the pressure of the scenario, the research assistant 
was instructed to terminate the experiment and debrief the student regarding 
the true nature of the study if he or she took too long to select an option, 
seemed overly stressed, or tried to leave the room.
178
 
B. STUDY RESULTS—THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT’S DILEMMA 
EXPOSED 
While academic discipline is not precisely equivalent to traditional 
criminal penalties, the anxiety experienced by students anticipating 
punishment is similar in form, if not intensity, to the anxiety experienced by 
an individual charged with a criminal offense.  As such, this study sought to 
recreate the innocent defendant’s dilemma in as real a manner as possible 
by presenting two difficult and discernible choices to students and asking 
them to make a decision.  This is the same mentally anguishing decision 
defendants in the criminal justice system must make every day.
179
  While it 
 
177 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 166, at 17–18.  The research assistants had scripted 
answers to common questions that might be asked while the students deliberated on their 
choices.  For example, answers were prepared for questions such as “I didn’t do it,” “What 
did the other person say?” “How can I be in trouble if this isn’t a class?” etc.  This was done 
to ensure the research assistants’ interactions with the study participants were uniform and 
consistent.  See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 12. 
178 See id.  After making their selection, the study participants were probed for suspicion 
and eventually debriefed regarding the true nature of the experiment.  During this debriefing 
process, the students were informed that helping other students outside the classroom setting 
was a very kind action and that they were, in fact, in no trouble.  The research assistants 
ensured that prior to leaving the room, the study participants understood that the nature of 
the study needed to remain confidential.   
179 See id.  One important distinction between the experimental methodology used in the 
authors’ study and previous studies is that the former included a definitive top end to the 
sentencing differential.  This better reflects the reality of modern sentencing, particularly in 
jurisdictions utilizing sentencing guidelines, and thus better captures the decisionmaking 
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was anticipated that this plea-bargaining study would reveal that innocent 
students, just like innocent defendants, sometimes plead guilty to an offense 
they did not commit in return for promises of leniency, the rate at which 
such false pleas occurred exceeded our estimations and should lead to a 
reevaluation of the role and method of plea bargaining today. 
1. Pleading Rates for Guilty and Innocent Students 
As had been anticipated, both guilty and innocent students accepted 
the plea bargain and confessed to the alleged conduct.
180
  In total, almost 
nine out of ten guilty study participants accepted the deal, while slightly 
fewer than six out of ten innocent study participants took the same path.
181
 
 
Figure 1 
Number and Percentage of Students by Condition (Guilty or Innocent) 
Rejecting and Accepting the Plea Offer 
Condition Rejected Plea Offer Accepted Plea Offer 
 No.   %  No.   % 
Guilty        4 10.8 33 89.2 
Innocent      17  43.6 22 56.4 
 
 
processes of criminal defendants faced with plea-bargaining decisions.  See Russano et al., 
supra note 149, at 483 (discussing the lack of a definitive sentence for those who failed to 
accept the deal). 
180 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 12–14.  We first tested our sample to see if 
there were any demographic differences with regards to the decision to accept a plea.  
Participants did not differ in their choices based on gender, 2(1, N = 76) = 0.24, p = 0.63 
(continuity correction applied), ethnicity 2(4, N = 76) = 0.51, p = 0.97, citizenship status 
2(1, N = 76) = 0.16, p = 0.90 (continuity correction applied), or whether or not English was 
the participant’s first language 2(1, N = 76) = 0.34, p = 0.56 (continuity correction applied).  
We also ensured that the decision of the participants did not differ by the experimenter 2(1, 
N = 76) = 0.83, p = 0.36.  Reported results, therefore, are collapsed across all of the 
previously mentioned groups. 
181 See id. at 13.  We conducted a three-way loglinear analysis to test the effects of guilt 
(guilt vs. innocence) and type of sanction (lenient vs. harsh) on the participant’s decision to 
accept the plea bargain.  The highest order interaction (guilt x sanction x plea) was not 
significant, 2(1, N = 76) = 0.26, p = 0.61.  What was significant was the interaction between 
guilt and plea, 2(1, N = 76) = 10.95, p < 0.01.  To break down this effect, a separate chi-
square test was performed looking at guilt and plea, collapsed across type of sanction.  
Applying the continuity correction for a 2 x 2 contingency table, there was a significant 
effect of guilt, 2(1, N = 76) = 8.63, p < 0.01, with the odds ratio indicating that those who 
were guilty were 6.38 times more likely to accept a plea than those who were innocent. 
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Two important conclusions stem from these results.
182
  First, as had 
been predicted by others, guilty defendants are more likely to plead guilty 
than innocent defendants.
183
  In our study, guilty defendants were 6.39 
times more likely to accept a plea than innocent defendants given the same 
sentencing options.
184
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Percentage of Students by Condition (Guilty or Innocent) 
Accepting the Plea Offer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, these results are consistent with predictions made by other 
scholars relying on case studies to predict the impact of innocence on plea-
bargaining decisions.
185
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 See id. at 13–14. 
183 See id.; see also Tor et al., supra note 102, at 113 (arguing that innocent defendants 
tend to reject plea offers more than guilty defendants); Covey, supra note 116, at 34. 
184 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 13. 
185 See Covey, supra note 116, at 1. 
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In his recent article entitled Mass Exoneration Data and the Causes of 
Wrongful Convictions, Professor Covey examined two mass-exoneration 
cases and predicted, based on the choices of defendants in those cases, that 
innocence mattered.
186
  While Professor Covey concedes that his 
examination of case studies only permits “some tentative comparisons,” it is 
fascinating to observe that the actions of the defendants in these two mass-
exoneration cases mirror the actions of our study participants.
187
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Percentage of Individuals by Condition (Guilty or Innocent) 
Accepting the Plea Offer in the Study and in Professor Covey’s Studies on 
Mass Exonerations 
Condition Dervan/Edkins Study Covey Mass Exonerations Studies 
 % % 
Guilty 89.2 89.0 
Innocent 56.4 77.0 
 
As the numbers reflect, guilty defendants in Professor Covey’s mass 
exoneration cases acted almost exactly as did guilty students in our 
experiment.
188
  In both cases, nine out of ten guilty individuals accepted the 
deal.
189
  While not as precise, in both the mass-exoneration cases and the 
plea-bargaining study, well over half of innocent individuals also selected 
the bargain over proceeding to trial.
190
  These similarities not only lend 
credibility to the results of our new study, but once again support the 
arguments of those who previously predicted that plea bargaining’s 
 
186 See id. (examining the mass exonerations in the Rampart case in California and the 
Tulia case in Texas). 
187 See id. at 34. 
Although the numbers are small, they are large enough to permit some tentative comparison.  
With respect to plea rates, the data show that innocence does appear to make some 
difference . . . .  Actually innocent exonerees thus plead guilty at a rate of 77%.  In comparison, 
22 of those who were not actually innocent pled guilty while 3 were convicted at trial.  In other 
words, 88% of those who were not innocent pled guilty.  Finally, of the remaining group of “may 
be innocents,” 17 pled guilty while two were convicted at trial, providing an 89% guilty plea 
rate. 
Id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id.; Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 13. 
190 See Covey, supra note 116, at 34; Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 13. 
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innocence problem affected more than just an isolated few.
191
 
The second and, perhaps, more important conclusion stemming from 
the study is that well over half of the innocent study participants, regardless 
of whether the lenient or harsh sentencing condition was employed, were 
willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a reduced punishment.
192
  
Previous research has argued that plea bargaining’s innocence problem is 
minimal because defendants are risk prone and willing to defend 
themselves before a tribunal.
193
  Our research, however, demonstrates that 
when study participants are placed in real, rather than hypothetical, 
bargaining situations and are presented with accurate information regarding 
their statistical probability of success, just as they might be so informed by 
their attorneys or the government during criminal plea negotiations, 
innocent individuals are actually highly risk averse.
194
 
Based on examination of the detailed notes compiled during the 
debriefing of each study participant, two common concerns drove the 
participants’ risk-averse behavior.  First, study participants sought to avoid 
the ARB process and move directly to punishment.
195
  Second, study 
 
191 See Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136–37. 
192 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 5.  While design constraints prevented the 
incorporation of counsel into our study, we believe that this omission does not lessen the 
significance of these findings.  First, while the presence of counsel may have resulted in a 
slight shift in outcomes, it is unlikely such representation would have dramatically altered 
the study results because the underlying decisionmaking factors presented to the participants 
would remain the same.  Second, it is important to note that many individuals in the U.S. 
criminal justice system proceed without counsel.  See SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 67, at 9.  
Finally, the results of this study are relevant for other institutions employing models based 
on the criminal justice system, many of which do not utilize an equivalent to counsel.  That 
students will acquiesce in such a manner should not only bring the criminal justice system’s 
use of plea bargaining into question, but also all other similar forms of adjudication 
throughout society.  For example, this would include reevaluation of student conduct 
procedures that contain offers of leniency in return for admissions of guilt. 
193 See Tor et al., supra note 102, at 106 (arguing based on a study utilizing an email 
questionnaire that innocent defendants are risk prone and on average were willing to proceed 
to trial rather than accept a plea); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2507 (2004) (“Defendants’ attitudes toward risk 
and loss will powerfully shape their willingness to roll the dice at trial.”). 
194 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 6; see also Bibas, supra note 193, at 2509 
(discussing risk aversion and loss aversion).  Professor Bibas notes that “most people are 
inclined to gamble to avoid sure losses and inclined to avoid risking the loss of sure gains; 
they are risk averse, but they are even more loss averse.  When these gains and losses are 
uncertain probabilities rather than certain, determinate amounts, the phenomenon is 
reversed.”  Id. 
195 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 6; see also Bowers, supra note 102, at 
1136–37. 
Likewise, over fifty percent of all misdemeanor charges that ended in conviction resulted in 
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participants sought a punishment that would not require the deprivation of 
direct future liberty interests.
196
  Further research is necessary in this area to 
fully understand these motivations, but one key trend is worth noting at this 
juncture.  The study participants’ actions appear to be directly mimicking a 
phenomenon that has drawn much debate and concern in recent years
197
:  
the students appear to have been selecting “probation” and immediate 
release rather than risking further “incarceration” through forced 
participation in a trial and, if found guilty, “confinement” in an ethics 
course or seminar.
198
  In essence, the study participants simply wanted to go 
home.
199
  This study suggests, therefore, that one needs to be concerned not 
only that significant sentencing differentials might lead felony defendants to 
falsely condemn themselves through plea bargaining, but also that 
misdemeanor defendants might be pleading guilty based on factors wholly 
distinct from their actual factual guilt.
200
 
2. The Impact of Sentencing Differentials 
One goal of the study was to offer two distinct punishments as a result 
of conviction by the ARB to determine if the percentage of guilty and 
innocent study participants accepting the plea offer rose as the sanction they 
risked if they lost at trial increased.
201
  As discussed previously, 
approximately half of the study participants were informed of the harsh 
sentencing condition and the other half were informed of the lenient 
sentencing condition.
202
 
 
nonjail dispositions.  Of the so-called jail sentences, fifty-seven percent were sentences of time 
served.  Even for defendants with combined felony and misdemeanor records, the rate of time-
served sentences dropped only to near fifty percent.  Further, the percentage of express time-
served sentences significantly underestimates the number of sentences that were in fact 
equivalent to time served, because most defendants with designated time sentences actually had 
completed those sentences at disposition. 
Bowers, supra note 102, at 1144. 
196 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 16. 
197 See Bibas, supra note 193, at 2492–93 (noting that pretrial detention can exceed the 
eventual prison sentence after trial); SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 67, at 7 (“But even where 
no jail time is imposed, and the court and the prosecutor keep their promises and allow a 
defendant to pay his fine and return to his home and job the same day, there are real 
punishments attendant to a misdemeanor conviction that have not yet begun.”). 
198 See Bowers, supra note 102, at 1136–37. 
199 See id. 
200 See SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 67, at 7 (discussing concerns regarding 
uncounseled defendants pleading guilty in quick arraignments and returning home the same 
day without understanding the collateral consequences of their decisions). 
201 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 3. 
202 See id. 
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Figure 4 
Percentage of Students by Condition (Guilty or Innocent) and  
Sentencing Condition (Harsh or Lenient) Accepting the Plea Offer 
Condition Rejected Plea Offer Accepted Plea Offer 
 Harsh Lenient Harsh Lenient 
    %      %     %       % 
Guilty   5.9    15.0   94.1 85.0 
Innocent   38.9     47.6   61.1 52.4 
Diagnosticity     1.54 1.62 
 
As the table above demonstrates, the subjects facing the harsh 
sentencing condition, regardless of guilt or innocence, accepted the plea 
offer at a rate almost 10% higher than the subjects facing the lenient 
sentencing condition.
203
  Unfortunately, this shift is not statistically 
significant due to the limited size of the study population, but the data does 
demonstrate that perhaps the study was on the right track; more research 
with a larger pool of participants and a greater “sentencing differential” is 
needed to examine this phenomenon further.
204
  Significant questions 
remain regarding how large a sentencing differential can become before the 
rate at which innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty becomes the same 
and regarding how sentencing differentials that include probation, as 
opposed to a prison sentence, influence a defendant’s decisionmaking.  
Such questions, however, must be reserved for future study. 
Just as interesting as the above shift in the percentage of study 
participants pleading guilty, perhaps, is the diagnosticity data collected 
during this portion of the study.
205
  Diagnosticity, as used in this study, is a 
calculation that ascertains whether one action or decision (e.g., the decision 
to accept a plea bargain) is indicative of some truth (e.g., guilt); in other 
words, acceptance of a plea bargain would be diagnostic of guilt if it was 
significantly more likely to occur with guilty defendants than with innocent 
defendants.
206
  Akin to an odds ratio, diagnosticity levels can be quite high, 
but commonly numbers hover around the single digits or low double digits. 
For example, a similar test was applied in the Russano study of 
 
203 See id. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See id.; see also Russano et al., supra note 149, at 484 (noting that diagnosticity in 
that study illustrated the “ratio of true confessions to false confessions”).  
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interrogation tactics.
207
  When Russano’s interrogators did not use any 
tactics to elicit a confession, the diagnosticity of the interrogation process 
was 7.67.
208
  By comparison, when Russano’s interrogators applied two 
interrogation tactics, the number of false confessions jumped to almost 50% 
and the diagnosticity of the process dropped to 2.02.
209
  This drop in 
diagnosticity meant that as Russano applied various interrogation tactics, 
the ability of the interrogation procedure to identify only guilty subjects 
diminished.
210
  Taken to the extreme, if one were to torture a suspect during 
interrogation, one would anticipate a diagnosticity of 1.0, which would 
indicate that the process was just as likely to capture innocent as guilty 
defendants.
211
 
In our study, the diagnosticity of the plea-bargaining process utilized 
was extremely low, a mere 1.54.
212
  That the diagnosticity of our plea-
bargaining process was considerably lower than the diagnosticity of 
Russano’s combined interrogation tactics is significant.
213
  First, it is 
important to note that plea bargaining’s diagnosticity in this study was 
strikingly low, despite the fact that our process did not threaten actual 
prison time or deprivations of significant liberty interests as happens every 
day in the actual criminal justice system.
214
  Further, this diagnosticity result 
indicates that innocent defendants may be more vulnerable to coercion in 
the plea-bargaining phase of their proceedings than even during a police 
interrogation.  While much focus has been given to increasing constitutional 
protections during police interrogations over the last half-century, perhaps 
the Supreme Court should begin focusing more attention on creating 
protections within the plea-bargaining process.
215
 
 
207 See Russano et al., supra note 149, at 484. 
208 See id. (7.67 diagnosticity was the result of only 6% of test subjects falsely 
confessing).  The Russano study stated, “[D]iagnosticity was highest when neither of the 
techniques was used and lowest when both were used.  More specifically, diagnosticity was 
reduced by nearly 40% with the use of a single interrogation technique . . . and by 74% when 
both techniques were used in combination.”  Id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 14. 
213 Russano et al., supra note 149, at 484; Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 14. 
214 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (1978) 
(arguing that plea bargaining’s sentencing differential means “[p]lea bargaining, like torture, 
is coercive”). 
215 See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological 
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 495–96 (1998) (“When police are trained 
to seek both independent evidence of a suspect’s guilt and internal corroboration for every 
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The other important aspect of our study’s diagnosticity data is that the 
diagnosticities of the harsh and lenient sentencing conditions were very 
similar.
216
  This was surprising, because it had been anticipated that the 
efficiency of the process would suffer greatly as we increased the 
punishment risked at trial.
217
  That the diagnosticity did not drop in this way 
when the harsh sentencing condition was applied means further research is 
necessary to better understand the true impact of sentencing differentials. 
Though further research is warranted, we suggest two hypotheses that 
might offer an explanation of the diagnosticity element of this study.  First, 
perhaps future studies will demonstrate that diagnosticity here did not drop 
significantly because it had little place left to go.
218 
 The diagnosticity for 
the lenient sentencing condition was already at 1.62, which, as discussed 
above, is exceptionally low.  That it did not drop meaningfully below this 
threshold when the sentencing differential was increased, therefore, may not 
be surprising, particularly given that a diagnosticity of 1.0 would mean that 
sentence severity had no ability to predict truthful plea deals.
219
  Second, 
perhaps future studies will reveal that the diagnosticity of our plea-
bargaining process began so low and failed to drop significantly when a 
harsher sentencing condition was applied because sentencing differentials 
operate in a manner other than previously predicted.
220
  Until now, many 
observers have predicted that sentencing differentials operate in a linear 
fashion (Figure 5), which means there is a direct relationship between the 
size of the sentencing differential and the likelihood a defendant will accept 
the bargain.
221
 
 
confession before making an arrest . . . the damage wrought and the lives ruined by the 
misuse of psychological interrogation methods will be significantly reduced.”); Russano et 
al., supra note 149, at 485 (“[W]e encourage police investigators to carefully consider the 
use of interrogation techniques that imply or directly promise leniency, as they appear to 
reduce the diagnostic value of an elicited confession.”); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 
1399, 1407 (2012) (“Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials,’ it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that 
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”) (citation omitted). 
216 See Edkins & Dervan, supra note 163, at 3, 5. 
217 See id. 
218 See Dervan, supra note 34, at 475 (discussing a similar phenomenon with regard to 
plea-bargaining rates, which are now in excess of 96% at the federal level). 
219 See Langbein, supra note 214, at 12–13. 
220 See Dervan, supra note 88, at 282 (“[I]n a simplistic plea bargaining system the 
outcome differential and the sentencing differential track closely.”); Yin, supra note 89, at 
443 (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts of duress and consideration 
against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more likely that a defendant is 
coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit offered in exchange for the 
guilty plea.”). 
221 See Dervan, supra note 88, at 282–83; Yin, supra note 89, at 443. 
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Figure 5 
Predicted Linear Relationship 
Between Plea-Bargaining Rates and Sentencing Differentials 
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It may be the case, however, that plea bargaining actually operates as a 
“cliff.”  This means that a particularly small sentencing differential may 
have little to no likelihood of inducing a defendant to plead guilty (Figure 
6).  However, once the sentencing differential reaches a critical size, its 
ability to immediately and markedly influence the decisionmaking process 
of a defendant, whether guilty or innocent, becomes almost 
overwhelming.
222
  Such a cliff effect would result in similar diagnosticities 
for both the harsh and lenient sentencing conditions because, once the 
critical size is reached, there is little additional impact that can be gained 
from further increasing the size of the differential. 
 
Figure 6 
Possible “Cliff” Relationship 
Between Plea-Bargaining Rates and Sentencing Differentials 
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222 There are many factors that might shift when this cliff is reached for a particular 
defendant.  See Bibas, supra note 193 (discussing factors that influence a particular 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty). 
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If future research indicates that this cliff effect is occurring, then these 
findings will be significant for at least three reasons.  First, this might mean 
that while research suggesting that the answer to plea bargaining’s 
innocence problem is better control of sentencing differentials is on the 
right track, such proposals will have to account for the cliff effect in 
selecting precisely how significant a differential to permit.
223
  Without such 
consideration, it is possible that a proposed limitation on sentencing 
differentials that permitted incentives beyond the cliff would have little 
positive impact on the coercive nature of subsequent plea offers.  Second, if 
such cliffs exist and are reached relatively quickly, as was the case in this 
study, consideration must be given to limiting the size of sentencing 
differentials more drastically then previously proposed.
224
  Finally, future 
research regarding such cliffs might reveal precise mechanisms through 
which to increase the efficiency of the plea-bargaining system.  For 
example, if it were revealed that guilty defendants required a smaller 
sentencing differential to reach their cliff, limiting sentencing differentials 
to such a size would simultaneously create a significant enough incentive 
for most guilty defendants to plead and not so great an incentive as to 
capture innocent ones.  While further research is necessary to understand 
this possible phenomenon better, consideration must now be given to the 
implications of a possible finding that small sentencing differentials are 
more powerful than previously predicted and operate in a very different 
way than previously assumed. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT’S DILEMMA 
In 1970, the same year the Supreme Court ruled that plea bargaining 
was a permissible form of justice in the Brady decision, the Court also 
accepted the case of North Carolina v. Alford.
225
  In Alford, the defendant 
 
223 See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1245 (2008) (discussing the benefits of fixed-plea discounts, 
including that such fixed discounts “prevent prosecutors from offering discounts so large that 
innocent defendants are essentially coerced to plead guilty to avoid the risk of a dramatically 
harsher sentence”); see also Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The 
Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 81 (“Dean Vorenberg suggests 
that a sentence discount of ten or twenty percent should encourage the requisite number of 
desired pleas.  This figure appears to be a reasonable one with which to begin . . . .  
Excessive sentence discounts should be constitutionally suspect because they place a burden 
on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights and negate the voluntary nature of his 
plea.”). 
224 Gifford, supra note 223, at 81. 
225 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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was indicted for first-degree murder.
226
  After Alford’s attorney questioned 
witnesses in the case and determined that there was a strong indication of 
guilt, he recommended Alford plead guilty to the prosecution’s offer of 
second-degree murder.
227
  Alford agreed but, during the plea hearing, 
continued to declare his innocence and stated that he was pleading guilty 
only to avoid the possibility of the death penalty.
228
  Despite the 
proclamations from Alford, the trial judge accepted the plea and sentenced 
the defendant to thirty years in prison.
229
  In approving of the trial court’s 
actions, the Supreme Court stated that it was permissible for a defendant to 
plead guilty even while maintaining his or her innocence.
230
  The Court 
stated, however, that there must be a “record before the judge contain[ing] 
strong evidence of actual guilt” to ensure the rights of the truly innocent are 
protected and guilty pleas are the result of “free and intelligent choice.”
231
  
Forty years later, three men serving sentences ranging from life in prison to 
death would use this form of bargained justice to walk free after almost two 
decades in prison for a crime they may never have committed.
232
 
In May 1993, the mutilated bodies of three eight-year-old boys were 
discovered in a drainage canal in Arkansas.
233
  Spurred by growing concern 
regarding satanic cults, police desperately searched for the killer or 
killers.
234
  As part of their investigation, police focused on a seventeen-year-
old named Jessie Lloyd Misskelley Jr.  Subjected to a twelve-hour 
interrogation, Misskelley eventually confessed to committing the killings 
 
226 See id. at 26–27. 
227 See id. at 27. 
228 See id. at 28. 
229 See id. at 29. 
230 Id. at 37; see also Leipold, supra note 95, at 1156 (“An Alford plea, where the 
defendant pleads guilty but simultaneously denies having committed the crime, clearly puts 
the court on notice that this guilty plea is problematic . . . .”). 
231 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 38 n.10.  Currently, the federal system, the District of 
Columbia, and forty-seven states permit Alford pleas.  See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing 
Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo 
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1372–73 n.52 (2003). 
232 See Campbell Robertson, Rare Deal Frees 3 in ’93 Arkansas Child Killings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at A1; see also Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the ‘Innocent’: An 
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 557–60 (1999) (discussing facts of the case); Leo & Ofshe, supra 
note 215, at 461–62 (discussing the Misskelley confession);  Mara Leveritt, Are ‘Voices For 
Justice’ Heard? A Star-Studded Rally on Behalf of the West Memphis Three Prompts the 
Delicate Question, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 137, 150–53 (2011) (discussing 
publicity surrounding the case).  
233 See Robertson, supra note 232, at A1, A12. 
234 See id. at A12. 
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along with two others teenagers, Damien Echols and Jason Baldwin, though 
his confession was “inconsistent with the facts of the case, was not 
supported by any evidence, and demonstrated that he lacked personal 
knowledge of the crime.”
235
  Though Misskelley later recanted his 
statement, all three teenagers were convicted at trial and became known as 
the “West Memphis Three.”
236
  Misskelley and Baldwin received life 
sentences, while Echols received the death penalty.
237
 
Following their convictions, the three young men continued to 
maintain their innocence and gradually, publicity regarding the case began 
to grow.
238
  Though many had argued for years that the West Memphis 
Three were innocent of the alleged offense, concern regarding the case 
reached a crescendo in 2007 after DNA testing conducted on items from the 
crime scene failed to match any of the three.
239
  Significantly, however, the 
DNA testing did find a match.
240
  Hair from the ligatures used to bind one 
of the victims matched Terry Hobbs, one of the victims’ stepfathers.
241
  
Though Hobbs had claimed not to have seen the murdered boys at all on the 
day of their disappearance, several witnesses came forward after the DNA 
test results were released to say they had seen him with the boys shortly 
 
235 See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 215,  at 461. 
236 See Robertson, supra note 232, at A12. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See Leveritt, supra note 232, at 151–52.  In considering the significance of plea 
bargaining’s innocence problem, one must also consider how likely it is that police 
inadvertently target the wrong suspect in a particular case—something that might eventually 
lead to an innocent suspect being offered a plea bargain in return for a false confession.  See 
Thomas, supra note 111, at 576.  
Despite Risinger’s wisdom about not attempting a global estimate of how many innocents are 
convicted, I continue to try to at least surround the problem.  We do know some things for 
certain.  An Institute of Justice monograph published in 1999 contained a study of roughly 
21,000 cases in which laboratories compared DNA of the suspect with DNA from the crime 
scene.  Remarkably, the DNA tests exonerated the prime suspect in 23% of the cases.  In another 
16%, the results were inconclusive.  Because the inconclusive results must be removed from the 
sample, the police were wrong in one case in four.  The prime suspect was innocent in one case 
out of four! 
Id. 
240 See Leveritt, supra note 232, at 151. 
241 See id.  (discussing the release of this DNA evidence by singer Natalie Maines during 
a rally for the West Memphis Three).  Further evidence in the case came to light as a result 
of a defamation lawsuit filed by Hobbs against Maines.  Id. at 151–52.  During a deposition 
in the defamation case, Hobbs stated that he had not seen the victims on the day of the 
murders.  Id.  When this information was released to the public, several witnesses came 
forward to state that they had seen Hobbs with the victims shortly before their 
disappearance.  Id. 
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before their murder.
242
 
By 2011, the newly discovered evidence in the case was deemed 
sufficient to call a hearing to determine if there should be a new trial.
243
  For 
the prosecution, however, the prospect of retrying the defendants given the 
weak evidence offered at the original trial and the new evidence indicating 
the three might be innocent was unappealing.
244
  According to the lead 
prosecutor, there was no longer sufficient evidence to convict the three at 
trial.
245
  Despite the strong language in Alford indicating that it was 
appropriate only in cases where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming 
and conviction at trial was almost ensured, the government offered the West 
Memphis Three a deal.
246
  They could continue to maintain their innocence, 
but would be required to enter an Alford plea of guilty to the 1993 murders 
of the three boys.
247
  In return, they would be released immediately.
248
  
While Baldwin was reluctant to accept the offer, he agreed to ensure Echols 
would be released from death row.
249
  Baldwin stated, “[T]his was not 
justice.  However, they’re trying to kill Damien.”
250
  On August 19, 2011, 
the West Memphis Three walked out of an Arkansas courtroom free men, 
though they will live with the stigma and collateral consequences of their 
guilty pleas for the rest of their lives.
251
  Whether they were guilty of the 
charged offenses may never be truly known, but it is clear that despite 
insufficient evidence to convict them at trial and strong indications that they 
were innocent, the three were enticed by the power of the plea-bargaining 
machine.
252
 
While the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for plea bargaining 
in Brady and approved bargained justice as a form of adjudication in the 
American criminal justice system, the Court also offered a cautionary note 
regarding the role of innocence.
253
  At the same time the Court made clear 
 
242 See id. 
243 See Robertson, supra note 232, at A12. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See id. (“Under the seemingly contradictory deal, Judge David Laser vacated the 
previous convictions, including the capital murder convictions for Mr. Echols and Mr. 
Baldwin.  After doing so, he ordered a new trial, something the prosecutors agreed to if the 
men would enter so-called Alford guilty pleas.”). 
249 See id. 
250 Id. 
251 See id. 
252 See id. 
253 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–58 (1970). 
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its belief that innocent defendants were not vulnerable to the powers of 
bargained justice, the Court reserved the ability to reexamine the entire 
institution should it become evident it was mistaken.
254
  The Court stated: 
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading 
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his exposure is reduced, the 
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are 
eliminated.  For the State there are also advantages—the more promptly imposed 
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of 
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial 
resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the 
defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its 
burden of proof.
255
 
Continuing to focus more directly on the possibility of an innocence issue, 
the Court stated: 
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for the innocent or that 
the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are necessarily 
valid in all respects.  This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to 
the court or to the jury.  Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound 
results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial.  We 
would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by 
offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by 
competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.
256
 
This caveat about the power of plea bargaining has been termed the Brady 
safety valve, because it allows the Supreme Court to reevaluate the 
constitutionality of bargained justice if the persuasiveness of plea offers 
becomes coercive and surpasses a point at which it begins to ensnarl an 
unacceptable number of innocent defendants.
257
 
Interestingly, Brady is not the only Supreme Court plea-bargaining 
case to include mention of the innocence issue and the safety valve.
258
  In 
 
254 See id. at 757–58; see also Dervan, supra note 26, at 87–88. 
255 Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). 
256 Id. at 757–58 (emphasis added). 
257 See Dervan, supra note 26, at 88.   
Safety-valves are intended to relieve pressure when forces within a machine become too great 
and, thereby, preserve the integrity of the machine.  The Brady safety-valve serves just such a 
purpose by placing a limit on the amount of pressure that can constitutionally be placed on 
defendants to plead guilty.  According to the Court, however, should plea bargaining become so 
common that prosecutors offer deals to all defendants, including those whose guilt is in question, 
and the incentives to bargain become so overpowering that even innocent defendants acquiesce, 
then the Brady safety-valve will have failed and the plea bargaining machine will have ventured 
into the realm of unconstitutionality. 
Id. 
258 See id. at 88–89. 
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Alford, for instance, the Court made clear that this form of bargained justice 
was reserved only for cases where the evidence against the defendant was 
overwhelming and sufficient to overcome easily the defendant’s continued 
claims of innocence.
259
  Where any uncertainty remained, the Supreme 
Court expected the case to proceed to trial to ensure that “guilty pleas are a 
product of free and intelligent choice,” rather than overwhelming force 
from the prosecution.
260
  The same language requiring that plea bargaining 
be utilized in a manner that permits defendants to exercise their free will 
was contained in the 1978 case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes.
261
  In 
Bordenkircher, the Court stated that the accused must be “free to accept or 
reject the prosecution’s offer.”
262
  Just as the Court had stated in Brady and 
Alford, it concluded its discussion in Bordenkircher by assuring itself that 
as long as such free choice existed and the pressure to plead guilty was not 
overwhelming, it would be unlikely that an innocent defendant might be 
“driven to false self-condemnation.”
263
 
As is now evident from the study described herein, the Supreme Court 
was wrong to place such confidence in the ability of individuals to assert 
their right to trial in the face of grave choices.
264
  In our research, more than 
half of the study participants were willing to forgo an opportunity to argue 
their innocence in court and instead falsely condemned themselves in return 
for a perceived benefit.
265
  That the plea-bargaining system may operate in a 
manner vastly different from that presumed by the Supreme Court in 1970 
and has the potential to capture far more innocent defendants than predicted 
means that the Brady safety valve has failed.  Perhaps, therefore, it is time 
for the Court to reevaluate the constitutionality of the institution with an eye 
towards the true power and resilience of the plea-bargaining machine. 
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